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ABSTRACT
The present American child welfare system infringes upon the fun-
damental liberty interests of millions of children and parents, is adver-
sarial and punitive, and fails to prevent child maltreatment or protect
children adequately from its most severe forms.  Many in the field now
recognize that a public health model would more effectively support the
parent–child relationship and protect children from maltreatment
than the current paradigm.  Despite much attention to such an ap-
proach, the field has yet to develop a clear vision for how the law could
or should support a public health approach or shape the actions of in-
dividuals and institutions best suited to lead a public health response.
This Article is the first to identify the core legal reforms necessary to
shape a public health approach to child welfare.
This Article identifies several legal pillars of the present parental-
fault paradigm that impede a public health approach and conceptual-
izes new laws designed to foster a public health approach.  First,
mandatory reporting and mandatory investigation laws—requiring
professionals to report and child protection agencies to investigate all
instances of suspected neglect—inhibit a public health response by im-
posing a coercive legal regime on an overly broad category of cases and
preventing professionals from making more effective interventions for
millions of children.
Second, state laws’ overly broad definitions of “abuse” and “neglect”
expand the range of situations subject to mandatory reporting and
mandatory investigations laws and permit coercive interventions to be-
come the dominant means of responding to serious child welfare
problems.
Third, the law should separate provision of services to children and
families from findings of fault by CPS agencies.  In the aggregate, fam-
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ilies involved with CPS agencies have relatively high levels of need and
would benefit from services provided as soon as possible.  Yet CPS
agencies tie services to findings of fault, denying services to many
families.
Fourth, federal funding law should cease preferred treatment of fos-
ter care and permit greater flexibility to provide a full spectrum of
interventions.
Fifth, the law should identify institutions, such as schools, hospi-
tals, and doctors, poised to implement a public health approach and
should develop legal reforms to push those institutions to do so.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The present American child welfare system follows a parental-
fault paradigm: the system uses legal power to identify and prove bad
parenting, then protect children from its consequences.  Essential de-
cisions focus on individual events of alleged parental misconduct
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rather than the full context of children’s and parents’ lives and needs.
The law has given this system a tremendously wide scope—whenever
there is reasonable suspicion that some parental fault exists, broadly
defined, the law triggers coercive state power.  The result is a system
that infringes upon the fundamental liberty interests of millions of
children and parents, costs billions of dollars, is adversarial and puni-
tive, and fails to prevent child maltreatment or protect children ade-
quately from its most severe forms.
Many in the field now recognize that a public health model would
provide a more effective means of supporting the parent–child rela-
tionship and protecting children from maltreatment than the current
paradigm.  A public health approach would provide a wider range of
interventions to achieve the goal of preventing future maltreatment
more effectively.  It would label parental fault only when coercive
state intervention is necessary to protect children and when less inva-
sive alternatives will not work or have not worked.  It would respond
to children’s evident needs by considering them in their full context—
which scholars have rightly identified as crucial to a truly child-cen-
tered approach1—and providing services without waiting to deter-
mine parental fault first.  Such an approach would better account for
the competing constitutional values at stake in child welfare—seeking
the most effective protection for children and assistance to families
while minimizing government coercion, invasions of core liberty inter-
ests, and sanctions.
Still, the field has yet to develop a clear vision for how the law
could support a public health approach or shape the actions of individ-
uals and institutions best suited to lead a public health response.  This
Article seeks to fill that void and identify the core legal reforms neces-
sary to shape a public health approach to child welfare.  It identifies
several legal pillars of the present parental-fault paradigm that im-
pede a public health approach and conceptualizes new laws designed
to foster a public health approach across a range of entities.
First, a set of laws that have structured the existing American
child protection system—in particular, mandatory reporting and
mandatory investigation laws—inhibit a public health response by im-
posing a coercive legal regime on an overly broad category of cases.2
When a professional is concerned about a family, the law directs that
professional to call in the concern to child protection agencies and in-
structs those agencies to investigate whether a parent is at fault.
Mandatory reporting statutes have become canonical in the United
States, but other developed countries protect children without them.
Child welfare experts from competing perspectives have offered robust
1. Infra notes 166–67 and accompanying text.
2. Infra Part III.
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criticisms of these laws, which overwhelm child protective services
(CPS)3 agencies with large numbers of relatively minor allegations
and make it harder for those agencies to protect children from the
most severe maltreatment.4  A public health perspective adds a new
critique: many mandatory reporters are best suited to coordinate a
public health response for the more than three million American chil-
dren annually reported to CPS agencies,5 but they do not do so be-
cause mandatory reporting laws instruct them to call CPS and then
let CPS handle the situation.
Mandatory investigation statutes—which require CPS agencies to
investigate every allegation of child abuse or neglect—cause CPS
agencies to invade the privacy of children and parents through coer-
cive and adversarial investigations.  Scholars have begun to recognize
how these investigations violate children’s and parents’ Fourth
Amendment rights and are themselves harmful to children.6  When
these investigations lead agencies to determine that a parent has ne-
glected a child, agencies then place parents’ names on child protection
registries.  This sanction often succeeds only in limiting parents’ job
prospects and thus their children’s economic futures.  Perhaps most
importantly, mandatory CPS investigations have been shown to miss
opportunities to prevent child abuse or neglect because they try to find
parental fault, not provide effective interventions.7
Although mandatory investigations remain the norm, they have
begun to fall into disfavor, as a growing number of CPS agencies apply
“differential response” approaches.  These agencies triage less severe
allegations and offer voluntary services to affected families without an
investigation and without placing parents on a registry.  Child protec-
tion investigators are then freed to focus on more severe allegations
and can more effectively protect children from the worst forms of
abuse and neglect.  While a significant step forward, differential re-
sponse involves implicit warnings that CPS will impose sanctions on
families that do not comply with services, a level of coercion that may
be unnecessary.  It still centralizes interventions in CPS agencies,
without fully involving individuals and institutions best suited to pro-
vide a public health response.
Second, state laws’ definition of “abuse” and “neglect” is quite
broad, granting agencies and courts wide authority to intervene coer-
3. Child protective services (CPS) refers to the state and local agencies that, despite
various names in different jurisdictions, are similarly charged with investigating
child abuse and neglect allegations, determining whether to remove children
from their families, and operating a foster care system.
4. Infra section III.A.
5. Infra note 56 and accompanying text.
6. Infra note 82.
7. Infra notes 112–20 and accompanying text.
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cively in families whenever a parent provides inadequate care.8
Under the present system, such broad definitions expand the range of
situations subject to mandatory reporting and mandatory investiga-
tions laws, thus increasing the harms just described by a significant
order of magnitude.  Broad definitions of abuse and neglect, coupled
with broad discretion given to CPS agencies and family court judges to
seek or impose dispositions that they think best, leads to a remarka-
bly inconsistent set of practices, in which some children are not pro-
tected enough and other children are removed from their families
unnecessarily.  Beyond the absence of equity, the resulting inconsis-
tent practice deprives researchers and policy makers of the shared
definitions of abuse and neglect necessary to develop public health
tools, such as statistically valid risk assessments to determine which
children are in greatest need of protection.
Third, the law should separate provision of services to children and
families from CPS agencies’ findings of fault.  In the aggregate, fami-
lies that come into contact with CPS agencies have relatively high
levels of need and would benefit from services provided as soon as pos-
sible, regardless of whether the abuse is substantiated.  Yet, in prac-
tice, CPS agencies tie services to substantiation.  Some laws even
permit agencies to take custody of children for the purposes of provid-
ing certain expensive services, rather than simply providing those ser-
vices directly to children and families.9  A public health approach
would seek to provide services whenever they make sense, without re-
gard to substantiation of a particular allegation.  Legal reforms can
direct CPS agencies to provide services whenever they are indicated—
even before completion of an investigation—to ensure families never
have to lose custody of their children to obtain services for them.
Fourth, federal funding laws should cease their preferred financial
treatment of foster care—the most invasive child welfare interven-
tion.10  Current federal law provides more generous funding for foster
care services than for services to help children remain safe in their
families’ custody.  A public health approach would permit greater flex-
ibility to states so that they can provide a full spectrum of interven-
tions to families.
Fifth, the law should identify institutions poised to implement a
public health approach and develop legal reforms to push those insti-
tutions to implement a public health response.  Primary and secon-
dary schools present an apt example.  Their personnel account for the
largest source of reports to child abuse and neglect hotlines and are
8. Infra Part IV.
9. This scenario most often occurs to place children in state-funded psychiatric resi-
dential treatment facilities or similarly intensive mental health services. Infra
notes 276–77 and accompanying text.
10. Infra Part VI.
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among those best suited to arrange a public health response because
they are familiar with children in their full context, including their
families, peer groups, and communities.  Yet when faced with a child
experiencing some form of maltreatment and the behavioral and aca-
demic consequences of it, schools typically focus on a limited range of
services for children or respond punitively to children when maltreat-
ment leads to bad behavior.  The law should structure schools to pro-
vide a public health response.  District, state, and federal education
authorities should create standards for when and how school staff at-
tempts to identify helpful services for families.  State and local govern-
ments should create legal ties between schools and other health and
social service agencies.  When school officials cannot accomplish what
they want for a child, the law should give them options other than
calling CPS.  For instance, states could create public health hotlines or
voluntary community family services programs in which any
mandatory reporter could call in-service providers better equipped to
provide the necessary assistance.
Pregnant and postpartum women who abuse drugs present an-
other example of the problem with mandatory reporter laws for hospi-
tals and doctors.  Most debates have focused on how to determine
which women to test for substance use and which to report to CPS
authorities.  This practice leaves the majority of families affected by
such substance use unidentified and, for a small portion of families,
triggers a particularly invasive form of intervention with little eviden-
tiary support.  A public health approach could improve identification
of families facing this serious health issue and the likelihood of a more
effective treatment, rather than a CPS response.  It would require
greater linkages between doctors and hospitals that are in positions to
identify families facing this problem, as well effective treatment facili-
ties both for pregnant women and postpartum women.  Facilities that
permit postpartum women to live with their children are necessary, as
are services to address any developmental needs that substance-ex-
posed children may have.  Professionals would continue to frequently
see women with substance-abuse problems and their children and call
CPS authorities when circumstances suggest a risk of near term harm
to the child or suggest that a coercive approach is necessary.
In the contested field of child welfare, some may read this Article’s
proposals to determine if they seek to expand state intervention to
protect children by increasing removals to foster care or if they seek to
limit such removals.  The answer is neither.  The present foster care
system is both over- and under-broad, and a public health approach
would seek to keep some families presently in foster care out of that
coercive system while better identifying other families whose children
need the protection of that system.
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This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I summarizes the existing
parental-fault paradigm and contrasts it with a public health ap-
proach.  Part I also explains the shortcomings of the present para-
digm—the children left unprotected from serious harm, the children
unnecessarily separated from their families, and the hundreds of
thousands, if not millions, of children and families with some serious
and treatable problems who fail to benefit from present CPS interven-
tions.  Part II identifies two pillars of the present system that impede
development of a public health approach—mandatory reporting and
mandatory investigation laws, which legally mandate an invasive, co-
ercive, and stigmatizing governmental response to a much wider set of
cases than call for such action.  Part III discusses the overly broad
definitions of abuse and neglect and the absence of clear legal guide-
lines for dispositions of children once parental abuse or neglect is
found.  Part IV argues that law reform is necessary to separate the
provision of or referrals to services by child protection agencies from
findings of parental fault.  Part V argues for reforming federal child
welfare financing to permit more flexibility for states to develop public
health approaches.  Part VI discusses new laws that can help catalyze
a public health approach, especially in public schools and with medical
professionals who serve pregnant and postpartum women who abuse
drugs.
II. PARENTAL FAULT, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE PRESENT
CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM’S FAILURES
A. Parental-Fault Paradigm
The present system centers on legal findings of parental faults, not
children’s needs.11  The system only intervenes in a family if the state
can prove that a parent has abused or neglected a child.  Parental
fault is jurisdictional; without it, there are no legal grounds for the
court system to intervene or for a child protection agency to force a
family to work with it.12  Child protection agencies investigate not
whether children or families have particular needs, but whether a
parent has done something wrong to endanger the child.  As Gary
11. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist Approach to
Protecting Endangered Children, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 409, 423 (2005) (ex-
plaining that because any state intervention that limits family autonomy violates
rights, “the model depends on parental fault as a predicate for state engagement
in the life of the child”).
12. The Supreme Court has held that parents are “entitled to a hearing on [their]
fitness as a parent before” the state may remove children from their custody.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).  If the state cannot prove that a
parent has abused or neglected a child—constitutionally, that a parent is unfit—
then the court must dismiss the case and lacks authority to intervene in the fam-
ily. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2317(b).
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Melton has put it, “By law, social workers’ time is focused first and
foremost on the question of ‘What happened?’, not ‘What can we do to
help?’”13  CPS investigations thus have, in the federal government’s
term, an “adversarial orientation.”14
This parental fault focus permeates the entire system.  C. Henry
Kempe’s seminal 1962 medical paper, “The Battered-Child Syn-
drome,” expressed some sympathy for child abusers as individuals suf-
fering from some serious disorder15 but nonetheless identified “a
small deviant ‘other’” that society could fairly condemn.16  The child
welfare system that developed following his influential paper assumes
that the children it impacts are endangered by a parent’s “moral, psy-
chological, physiological, or some other personal failing,”17 even if the
system developed a scope far beyond the severe abuse cases that
Kempe described.18  Accordingly, the system’s “master narrative” is
one of children victimized by deviant or degenerate parents19 and thus
in need of coercive state protection.20  Social science literature has
13. Gary B. Melton, Mandatory Reporting: A Policy Without Reason, 29 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 9, 14 (2005).
14. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, DIFFER-
ENTIAL RESPONSE TO REPORTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 6, (2008), available
at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue_briefs/differential_response/differenti
al_response.pdf. [hereinafter DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE]. See also HARVEY
SCHWEITZER & JUDITH LARSEN, FOSTER CARE LAW: A PRIMER 65 (2005) (explain-
ing that child protection investigation “is most often adversarial rather than
cooperative”).
15. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 17,
20 (1962) (describing one abusive mother who “wishe[d] to be a kind, good
mother, [but] repeat[ed] the behavior of her own mother toward herself” and an-
other whose “impairment in mental functioning was probably the prime factor
associated with poor control of aggressive impulses”).
16. Howard Dubowitz, The Battered Child Syndrome Paper: Influence on the Field of
Child Neglect, in C. HENRY KEMPE: A 50 YEAR LEGACY TO THE FIELD OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 51, 53 (Richard D. Krugman & Jill E. Korbin eds., 2013).
17. DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 27 (2d ed. 2004).
18. See infra notes 176–79 and accompanying text (comparing the scope of
mandatory reporting laws proposed by Kempe and his colleagues to the broader
requirements actually enacted).
19. Matthew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the
Master Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1, 2, 8–16 (2010); see also
Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 121–29
(2013) (explaining the consequences of the flawed framework of current child pro-
tection policies); Annette R. Appell, On Fixing “Bad” Mothers and Saving Their
Children, in “BAD” MOTHERS: THE POLITICS OF BLAME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 356 (Molly Ladd-Taylor & Lauri Umansky eds., 1998) (describing the
unique situation of “bad” mothers in the child welfare system because of the puni-
tive nature of the system and the state’s inability to be a “good” parent).
20. Neil Gilbert, Conclusion: A Comparative Perspective, in COMBATING CHILD ABUSE:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND TRENDS 232 (Neil Gilbert ed., 1997) (compar-
ing the “Child Protection Model” in the United States to the “Family Services
Model,” which describes the systems of several European nations); see also ISLA
WALLACE & LISA BUNTING, AN EXAMINATION OF LOCAL, NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
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viewed child maltreatment as “psychopathology,” with public agencies’
responses to such maltreatment framed in direct response to the diag-
nosed pathology, ignoring contextual elements that contribute to the
maltreatment.21  Involvement with the child protection system is stig-
matizing—to parents, to mothers, and especially to the poor and black
mothers who are disproportionately labeled as bad parents through
the child protection system.22  The parental-fault focus also shapes
the media’s portrayal of child maltreatment as a legal and policy
issue.23
The parental-fault model logically focuses on a parent’s individual
actions deemed abusive or neglectful and attributes responsibility for
those actions to the individual parent—not broader familial, social, ec-
onomic, or other factors.  Cases involving domestic violence between a
parent (usually a mother) and her partner, who is unrelated to the
child, provide a vivid illustration.  Needing to find fault with the
mother, CPS systems blame her for “failure to protect” her child from
the partner’s abuse or even from exposure to the partner’s abuse of the
parent simply because the parent is in a relationship with the abusive
partner.24  Child protection agencies expect women to leave their part-
ners without considering the many complex factors that prevent such
decisions.25 The simplistic diagnosis of the problem leads to service
plans that fail to meet individual families’ needs.26
TIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MANDATORY REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE: THE IM-
PLICATIONS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND 12 (2007), available at http://www.nspcc.org.
uk/Inform/publications/downloads/mandatoryreportingNI_wdf51133.pdf (same).
21. Richard J. Gelles, Child Abuse as Psychopathology: A Sociological Critique and
Reformulation, in CHILD ABUSE AND VIOLENCE 49 (David G. Gil ed., 1979).
22. See Michael S. Wald, Taking the Wrong Message: The Legacy of the Identification
of the Battered Child Syndrome, in C. HENRY KEMPE: A 50 YEAR LEGACY TO THE
FIELD OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 16, at 89, 97 (“[B]lame is often in
the minds of the parents, the community, and many workers when a child is la-
beled maltreated.”); Melissa L. Breger, The (In)visibility of Motherhood in Family
Court Proceedings, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 555 (2012) (describing neg-
ative views of mothers in child abuse and neglect cases); Marie Ashe, “Bad
Mothers,” “Good Lawyers,” and “Legal Ethics,” 81 GEO. L.J. 2533, 2547 (1993)
(describing the “gendered focus of child dependency law” as imposing a “stigma of
‘badness’” on women); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF
CHILD WELFARE 28 (2002) (describing stigma attached to parents of foster
children).
23. AXEL AUBRUN & JOSEPH GRADY, HOW THE NEWS FRAMES CHILD MALTREATMENT:
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (2003), available at http://www.issuelab.org/re-
source/how_the_news_frames_child_maltreatment_unintended_consequences.
24. E.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
25. Jane C. Murphy & Margaret J. Potthast, Domestic Violence, Substance Abuse,
and Child Welfare: The Legal System’s Response, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y
88, 113–14, 116 (1999).
26. Murphy and Potthast found that none of the cases they studied had anything
other than boilerplate service plans, violating the legal mandate for more contex-
tual plans. Id. at 117.
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The child welfare system can also provide some assistance to fami-
lies facing poverty and related stressors—but only after child protec-
tion agencies investigate a charge that a poor parent has abused or
neglected his or her child.27  One parent in a community with a dis-
proportionately high rate of child-protection-agency involvement de-
scribed the issue powerfully:
[T]he advertisement, it just says abuse.  If you being abused, this is the num-
ber you call. . . . It doesn’t say if I’m in need of counseling, or if I’m in need of
my children don’t have shoes, if I just can’t provide groceries even though I
may have seven kids, but I only get a hundred something dollars food
stamps.28
As a logical extension of its focus on individual parental fault, the
system separates parents deemed bad both from their children and
often from other family members who are trying to help both parent
and child—a result that can undermine parents’ rehabilitation and
thus their child’s interests.  Two recent cases that gained local media
attention illustrate the point: Anna Brown lost her two children to fos-
ter care after a tornado destroyed her home, she lost her job, and utili-
ties to her new home were cut off and she used small fires in the home
to keep her and her children warm.29  When police were finally called,
Ms. Brown did not seem lucid; she may have had unaddressed mental
health problems.30  The family court ordered that Brown’s children
live with Brown’s mother on the condition that she not let Brown live
with her.31  Brown’s mother had wanted to take both mother and child
in so she could protect and raise her grandchildren and help her
daughter.32  Denied that support, Brown became homeless.33  She
later died in a jail cell from an undiagnosed blood clot.34  In another
case, Shakur Knight was taken from his mother at birth because he
was born with cocaine in his system.35  Authorities refused to release
27. Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black
Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1485 (2012).
28. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Racial Geography of Child Welfare: Toward a New Re-
search Paradigm, 87 CHILD WELFARE 125, 145 (2008).
29. Christine Byers, Woman Unhappy with Care at St. Mary’s Hospital is Arrested
for Trespassing, Dies in Jail, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 25, 2012, at A1,
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/woman-unhappy-with-care-
at-st-mary-s-hospital-is/article_ed640f3d-64a0-516c-88ff-fb770b5e9677.html.  In
full disclosure, I became involved in the court case regarding Ms. Brown’s chil-







35. Nancy Cambria, Safety Cracks in Missouri Foster Policies, ST. LOUIS POST-DIS-
PATCH, Mar. 31, 2012, at A1, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/safety-
cracks-in-foster-policies/article_d2900118-de9c-5f22-abe3-33cce71104d8.html.
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Shakur to his father, a fit parent, because Shakur’s parents lived to-
gether and his father refused to move out or make Shakur’s mother
move out (the parents were jointly raising other children).36  Shakur
was subsequently abused in foster care, suffering multiple fractures,
and retinal and subdural hemorrhaging.37
The forced separation of these parents from their own family sup-
ports occurred contrary to social science evidence suggesting that
these parents’ rehabilitation, and thus their children’s long-term in-
terests, are best served by keeping them as close as possible to their
children and other family supports, especially when parents have sub-
stance-abuse problems.38  These separations also reflect a remarkably
unnuanced approach to difficult situations.  Even when a mother’s
drug addiction prevents her from adequately parenting her child, liv-
ing in the same home with his or her mother would not necessarily
risk the child’s safety—especially when there is another fit parent or
other family caretaker.  The system found parental fault (drug abuse)
and removed the child without considering any alternative measures
to keep the child safe.
The existing system also treats children outside of their family and
community context, especially after it removes children from families.
The system often ignores children’s connection to their parent, follow-
ing what Annette Appell has called the “myth of separation.”39  The
foster care system has only in recent years gained a greater apprecia-
tion for the value of placing children with extended family members
rather than strangers.40  The foster care system frequently disrupts
other elements of the child’s life; placement in foster care often means
placement in a new school, surrounded by completely new children
and new teachers, with bad results for children.41
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Ellen M. Weber, Child Welfare Interventions for Drug-Dependent Pregnant Wo-
men: Limitations of a Non-Public Health Response, 75 UMKC L. REV. 789,
832–33 (2007) (collecting research).
39. Annette Ruth Appell, The Myth of Separation, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 291
(2011).
40. Rob Geen, Kinship Foster Care: An Ongoing, yet Largely Uninformed Debate, in
KINSHIP CARE: MAKING THE MOST OF A VALUABLE RESOURCE 1,1 (Rob Geen ed.,
2003) (describing the shift from 1980s, when kinship foster care was rare, to the
early 2000s, when “child welfare agencies increasingly consider kin as the first
placement choice when foster care is needed”).
41. E.g., NATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON FOSTER CARE AND EDUCATION, EDUCATION IS
THE LIFELINE FOR YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE 2 (2011), available at http://www.ameri-
canhumane.org/children/stop-child-abuse/advocacy/educationfostercareresearch
datasheetjuly2011-00005200.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (presenting data on
the number of foster-care placements and the effect on foster children of changing
schools); Peter J. Pecora et al., Assessing the Educational Achievements of Adults
Who Were Formerly Placed in Family Foster Care, 11 CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK
220 (2006).
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The existing system does account—somewhat—for the value of the
parent–child relationship.  The law requires state agencies to make
“reasonable efforts” to prevent the need for removing children and,
once children are removed, to reunify them with their parents.42
Many CPS agencies now use techniques such as family group decision-
making, in which extended family members and other people chosen
by the family gather to discuss alternatives to foster care, to develop
plans to keep children safe without using foster care.43  In addition, a
growing number of CPS agencies use “differential response” to provide
less coercive and stigmatizing interventions for families with children
at relatively low risk of harm.44  CPS agencies report that they pro-
vide services to many more intact families than to children in foster
care,45 although the range and quality of these services may be ques-
tioned.46  These elements, however, exist in the context of a broader
legal structure that depends on reporting, investigating, and finding
parental fault.  CPS agencies generally provide services to keep fami-
lies intact only after they have first investigated allegations of abuse
or neglect and found parental fault.  And, as described more fully in
section I.B., the present system’s focus on parental fault has neither
succeeded in providing effective services to prevent maltreatment and
improve family functioning nor adequately protected children from
the most severe forms of abuse.
B. The Present Parental-Fault Paradigm Has Not Succeeded
In the present child welfare system, the severe cases for which a
parental-fault paradigm is appropriate are far outnumbered by less
dangerous cases.  The system largely deals with parents who have
unaddressed or inadequately addressed mental health conditions or
substance-abuse problems and with families that have a variety of
poverty-related stressors—like unstable housing and employment, vi-
olent neighborhoods, and bad schools.  These are cases with few true
villains and many flawed but sympathetic victims—including the par-
ents deemed perpetrators.47  For the majority of child welfare cases,
42. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2006).
43. For a summary of family group decision-making and listing of research into it,
see AM. HUMANE ASS’N, Family Group Decision Making, http://www.americanhu-
mane.org/children/programs/family-group-decision-making/ (last visited Aug. 2,
2013).
44. Infra section III.B.
45. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, 81–95, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADMIN.
FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES (2012), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/
files/cb/cm11.pdf.
46. Infra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.
47. See Michael S. Wald, Taking the Wrong Message: The Legacy of the Identification
of the Battered Child Syndrome, in C. HENRY KEMPE: A 50 YEAR LEGACY TO THE
FIELD OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 16, at 89, 96 (arguing that most
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we apply a system designed for parents who engage in a pattern of
clearly dangerous and morally culpable behavior to much more mor-
ally fraught situations, in which assigning fault can generously be de-
scribed as an inexact art.  At the same time, many children continue
to face death and severe injury from abuse in alarming numbers.
Some have even claimed that child protection agencies remain una-
ware of the majority of maltreated children.48  Our system is both
under- and over-inclusive; many children who need protection do not
receive it, and many are forced into our child protection system de-
spite being poor fits for it.49
Much of the public policy debate in this field focuses on what
should be done once state authorities remove children from their fami-
lies and place them in foster care.50  This focus tends to avoid critical
discussion of the parental fault approach and, rather, tends to assume
that fault has already been assigned and the issues relate to when the
child can reunify with a parent or how the child can leave foster care
to a new permanent home.  This focus on a relatively narrow set of
cases—those in which CPS removes children from their families—
does not yield a comprehensive understanding of the child welfare sys-
tem because these cases represent less than 10% of all cases touched
by that system (see Table 1).
Analyzing the present child welfare system and its parental-fault
paradigm requires a basic understanding of the system’s full scope.  In
2011:
• The child welfare system had 3.4 million child protection hotline
referrals51 involving roughly 6.2 million children.52  Most of
these calls were made by mandatory reporters—individuals le-
instances labeled “maltreatment” result from a constellation of poverty, mental
health conditions, social isolation, domestic violence, and assorted other
problems); Edwina G. Richardson-Mendelson, Remarks Delivered April 13, 2012
to the Brooklyn Law School Symposium on Reforming Child Protection Law: A
Public Health Approach, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 141, 142 (2012) (describing her docket of
impoverished and overwhelmed parents, many of whom were themselves mal-
treated); Gary B. Melton, How Strong Communities Restored My Faith in Hu-
manity: Children Can Live in Safety, in PREVENTING CHILD MALTREATMENT:
COMMUNITY APPROACHES 82, 85 (Kenneth A. Dodge & Doriane Lambelet Coleman
eds., 2009) (“[M]ost cases . . . do not involve evil or sick parents.”).
48. Ruth Gilbert et al., Developing Services for a Public Health Approach to Child
Maltreatment, 20 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 323, 326 (2012).
49. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering Child Abuse and
Society’s Response, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 819 (2010).
50. The two leading federal policy changes of the last two decades focus on more ef-
fectively serving children in foster care and speed their exit from it.  Fostering
Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
351, 122 Stat. 3949; Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89,
111 Stat. 2115.
51. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra note 45, at 5.
52. Id. at 6.
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gally required to report suspected abuse or neglect to child pro-
tection authorities.53  These referrals amount to a large
proportion of all American children; by the time they turn eigh-
teen, about 15% of all children born in the United States will be
reported to a child protection agency.54  In one state, 13.9% of all
children were reported to CPS authorities by the age of five.55
• 1,647,214 of those reports, involving 3,049,679 children,56 were
“screened-in,” meaning CPS agencies deemed the reports to al-
lege facts that, if true, would constitute abuse or neglect.57  In
most jurisdictions, state law requires CPS agencies to investi-
gate all screened-in reports.58
• CPS agencies “substantiated”—made an administrative finding
that the child was abused or neglected—regarding 676,569 chil-
dren, about 22% of the total.59  These findings are based on legal
definitions of abuse or neglect that are broad enough to encom-
pass a wide range of behavior.60
• CPS agencies removed 252,320 children from their homes.61
Only 8.3% of all children subject to child abuse or neglect reports
were placed in foster care; the remaining 91.5%—2.7 million
children—never left home.
• The number of children with extended stays in foster care was
even smaller.  The number of children who left foster care in less
than six months after the state removed them was 67,522.62
Thus, the children subject to the category of cases that has re-
ceived the most attention—children removed from their families
and placed in foster care for some extended period of time—is
53. Id. at 8.  The cited statistic refers to “professional[ ]” reporters who are generally
mandated by law to report suspected abuse or neglect. See infra section III.A.
54. Michael S. Wald, Taking the Wrong Message: The Legacy of the Identification of
the Battered Child Syndrome, in C. HENRY KEMPE: A 50 YEAR LEGACY TO THE
FIELD OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 16, at 89, 92.
55. A longitudinal study in California found that 293,441 of the 2,112,277 children
born in that state during a four-year period were reported to CPS by age five.
Emily Putnam-Hornstein et al., A Public Health Approach to Child Maltreatment
Surveillance: Evidence from a Data Linkage Project in the United States, 20
CHILD ABUSE REV. 256, 261, 265 (2011).  The rate is more than double for black
children—29.7%. Id. at 266.
56. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra note 45, at 11, 30.
57. “Screened-out” cases involve requests for assistance, not reports of abuse or neg-
lect, or allegations that, even if true, would not rise to the level of abuse or neg-
lect. Id. at 5–6.
58. See infra section III.B.
59. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra note 45, at 32.
60. See infra Part IV.
61. THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2011 ESTIMATES AS OF JULY 2012, 1, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport19.pdf. [hereinaf-
ter AFCARS REPORT].
62. Id. at 3.
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even smaller, 184,798, or 6.1% of all children who were the sub-
jects of screened-in CPS reports.63
At the same time, state authorities attributed 1545 children’s
deaths to abuse or neglect in 2011.64  Rates of child fatalities from
abuse or neglect have remained fairly steady; between 2006 and 2010,
they fluctuated between a low of 2.00 per 100,000 children to a high of
2.32 per 100,000.65  These rates of child maltreatment deaths place
the United States at the bottom of the scale of rich nations, and more
than double the rates of comparable nations.66  In the United States,
the number of child fatalities from abuse or neglect has remained
fairly steady, at least back to the 1970s, while rates declined in many
other rich nations.67  Although some have suggested that the modern
child welfare system, especially the advent of mandatory reporting
and investigation statutes, has reduced child fatalities,68 the more de-
tailed empirical studies have found no evidence of any correlation, let
alone causation, nor any clear evidence that maltreatment-related fa-
talities have declined.69  The rate of child fatalities has even increased
somewhat in recent decades, from about 1.3 deaths per 100,000 chil-
dren in the mid-1980s, to 1.92 in the mid-1990s, to slightly above 2.00
in recent years,70 although this may result from improved procedures
63. The 252,320 children removed from their homes minus 67,522 children who left
foster care in less than six months equals 184,798 children removed from their
homes and placed in foster care for six months or more.
64. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra note 45, at 63.
65. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2010, 65, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN.
FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES (2011), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/
cb/pubs/cm10/cm10.pdf.  The rate was 2.10 in 2011, the most recent year with
available data. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra note 45, at 63.
66. The United States ranked 26th out of twenty-seven nations with a child fatality
from maltreatment rate of 2.2 per 100,000 children.  Twenty-three nations had
rates under 1.0. A LEAGUE TABLE OF CHILD MALTREATMENT DEATHS IN RICH NA-
TIONS 4, UNICEF (2003), available at http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/
repcard5e.pdf.
67. UNICEF reports that American deaths from child maltreatment remained steady
between the 1970s and the 1990s, while rates declined in fourteen of twenty-
seven nations studied. Id. at 9.
68. DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, RECOGNIZING CHILD ABUSE 10–11 (1990).
69. LINDSEY, supra note 17, at 130–37. See also Michael S. Wald, Taking the Wrong
Message: The Legacy of the Identification of the Battered Child Syndrome, in C.
HENRY KEMPE: A 50 YEAR LEGACY TO THE FIELD OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
supra note 16, at 89, 95 (describing as “unclear” whether child maltreatment fa-
talities have declined).
70. David Wiese & Deborah Daro, Current Trends in Child Abuse Reporting and Fa-
talities: The Results of the 1994 Annual Fifty State Survey (Nat’l Comm. to Pre-
vent Child Abuse, Working Paper No. 808, 1996), available at http://www.
liftingtheveil.org/ncpca94.htm (last updated Jan. 18, 1996), and CHILD MAL-
TREATMENT 2010, supra note 65, at 65.
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to review child deaths and identify those caused by maltreatment.71
And very large numbers of reports and investigations, most of which
are not substantiated and most of which do not lead to child removals,
have been the hallmark of our system for several decades.72





















































The system that has been in place for a generation thus places a
parental-fault paradigm across a huge range of cases, at least the
three million children subject to investigations, most of whom are not
good fits for that paradigm.  In so doing, the system imposes at least
five kinds of harm.
First, the present system’s wide scope prevents it from protecting
children against the most severe forms of abuse—the very forms for
which the system was created to protect against.  Roughly 1500 chil-
71. Michael S. Wald, Taking the Wrong Message: The Legacy of the Identification of
the Battered Child Syndrome, in C. HENRY KEMPE: A 50 YEAR LEGACY TO THE
FIELD OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 16, at 89, 95 n.12.
72. Douglas J. Besharov & Lisa A. Laumann, Child Abuse Reporting, 33 SOC. SCI. &
MOD. SOC’Y 40 (1996).
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dren are killed by abuse or neglect each year,73 and some significant
number had prior contact with CPS.74  Moreover, reviews of many of
these fatalities found some mistakes by child protection authorities;
one New York City study found 396 mistakes in a review of 212 child
fatalities over three years, suggesting a significant inability of CPS
authorities to complete thorough investigations in all cases.75  These
child fatality statistics have remained stable for decades, suggesting a
long-standing and unresolved problem within the prevailing child-
welfare paradigm.76  The stagnant number of fatalities should provide
an impetus to reduce the most severe harms.  There is little reason to
conclude that the extremely broad scope of the present child welfare
system is necessary to prevent those fatality numbers from increasing.
As discussed in more depth below, declining to investigate less serious
allegations likely improves the safety of affected children.77  Beyond
the child deaths and serious injuries that an overwhelmed child pro-
tection system fails to prevent, the present child-protection reporting
system fails to identify a large share of cases, including cases involv-
ing severe abuse.78  For instance, the federal government estimates
that CPS only investigates 55% of cases involving sexual abuse of a
child.79
73. Supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
74. Estimates of child fatalities with prior CPS contact vary.  In 1995, 48% of child
fatalities involved children with whom CPS authorities had some prior contact.
Douglas J. Besharov, Commentary, Four Commentaries: How We Can Better Pro-
tect Children from Abuse and Neglect, 8 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 120, 120
(1998).  States reported that they had previously provided services to 10.2% of
families in which child fatalities occurred in 2011. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011,
supra note 45, at 65–66.  This figure does not include all children who were
known to CPS authorities through prior investigations.
75. BETSY GOTBAUM, DANGEROUS MISTAKES: ANALYSIS OF ACS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
INVOLVING CHILD FATALITIES IN 2005, 3 (2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/records/pdf/govpub/moved/pubadvocate/CHILDFATALITYREPORTWEB
FINAL.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).
76. DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING AND INVESTIGA-
TION: POLICY GUIDELINES FOR DECISION MAKING 1 (1988).  Besharov attributed
CPS’s failure to protect children in these cases to the large burdens placed on
CPS agencies to investigate less serious and unsubstantiated allegations, leading
investigators to miss evidence and delay investigations.  Besharov, supra note 74,
at 120–21.
77. See infra notes 226–27 and accompanying text.
78. Natalie K. Worley & Gary B. Melton, Mandated Reporting Laws and Child Mal-
treatment: The Evolution of a Flawed Policy Response, in C. HENRY KEMPE: A 50
YEAR LEGACY TO THE FIELD OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 16, at 103,
104, 108, available at http://0-link.springer.com.library.unl.edu/chapter/10.1007/
978-94-007-4084-6_13; Michael Wald, Beyond Maltreatment: Developing Support
for Children in Multiproblem Families 16 (Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No.
2205471, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2205471.
79. FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4),
2004–2009, 8-6, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. &
FAMILIES (2010), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/research/pro-
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Moreover, evidence exists that by screening out and not investigat-
ing less severe cases, the quality of remaining investigations im-
proves.  A study of Missouri’s “differential response” pilot—through
which state officials only investigated more severe allegations and di-
verted less severe reports—concluded that by reducing the number of
less serious investigations, authorities had more investigatory time to
focus on sexual abuse cases.80  Those investigations were more com-
prehensive, and police were able to gather enough evidence to arrest
more perpetrators of sexual abuse and prevent them from preying on
more children.81  More research is necessary to reach a certain conclu-
sion, but the Missouri results comport with the logical intuition that
focusing investigative resources on the most severe, highest-priority
cases will improve authorities’ ability to investigate such cases
effectively.
Second, the system imposes child-protection investigations on a
large number of children and parents who have no need for that inter-
vention.  These investigations are invasive of the right to family integ-
rity and cause significant anxiety and other emotional distress.82
These invasions of liberty occur whenever a child-protection investiga-
tion occurs83—millions of times every year.
Third, for the 700,000 or so children whom CPS agencies find to
have been abused or neglected every year,84 the current approach
leads to parents’ placement on state child protection registries.  Place-
ment on such registries imposes a legal prohibition on those parents
working as childcare providers, bus drivers, and home health-aides.85
ject/national-incidence-study-of-child-abuse-and-neglect-nis-4-2004-2009 [herein-
after NIS-4].
80. L. ANTHONY LOMAN, INST. OF APPLIED RESEARCH, DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IM-
PROVES TRADITIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: CRIMINAL ARRESTS FOR SEVERE PHYSICAL
AND SEXUAL ABUSE (2005), available at http://www.iarstl.org/papers/DiffRespAnd
Investigations.pdf.
81. Id. See also Jane Waldfogel, Differential Response, in PREVENTING CHILD MAL-
TREATMENT: COMMUNITY APPROACHES, supra note 47, at 139, 145–46 (discussing
this and other Missouri differential response studies).
82. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The
Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 413 (2005); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta
v. Greene, Child Protection Investigations, and the Need to Reform the Fourth
Amendment Special Needs Doctrine, 87 TUL. L. REV. 353 (2012); Besharov, supra
note 74, at 121 (“[T]he determination that a report is unfounded can be made only
after what is often a traumatic investigation and, inherently, a breach of parental
and family privacy.”).
83. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 82, at 369.
84. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 210.900–936 (2013) (including childcare workers,
elder-care workers, and personal-care attendants on the list of professions requir-
ing a clean registry); see generally ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF CENTRAL
REGISTRIES FOR CHILD ABUSE REPORTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
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This prohibition disproportionately affects lower-income families, who
are over-represented among the families affected by CPS investiga-
tions and substantiations.  This prohibition lasts years—the federal
government reports that the norm is at least until the alleged victim
of maltreatment has reached adulthood—without reference to paren-
tal rehabilitation.86  By barring entire categories of employment and
formally labeling a parent as abusive or neglectful, such placements
trigger due process protections.87  They hurt parents’ employment
prospects and thus limit parents’ ability to provide for their chil-
dren.88  They have this effect whether a parent was found to have se-
verely abused a child or to have more modestly neglected a child.
Even when agencies conclude that a child does not need protection
from a parent, the state limits the parent’s employment options.
Moreover, child protection registries are plagued by inaccuracies.
The Second Circuit has described administrative findings of abuse or
neglect as “at best imperfect,” noting that three-quarters of adminis-
trative challenges to such findings are successful.89  Challenges fre-
quently only occur when the administrative findings lead a parent to
lose a job,90 and a long backlog of administrative challenges may exist
in some jurisdictions,91 suggesting that many parents with legitimate
claims do not challenge these administrative findings or cannot pur-
sue a timely challenge of them.
These registries provide an important benefit; when a CPS agency
finds that a parent has severely abused children, that person should
not be placed in a position of trust regarding other children.  But it is
much harder to argue that the child protection registry annual listings
of 700,000 adults—most of whom are not considered by CPS agencies
to have done something warranting removal of a child—consistently
serves that purpose.  If a mother is deemed to have used “excessive
corporal punishment” for disciplining a child with a belt and is
ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES (2011), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/
systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/centreg.pdf.
86. REVIEW AND EXPUNCTION OF CENTRAL REGISTRIES AND REPORTING RECORDS 3,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES (2011),
available at https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/reg-
istry.pdf (“Substantiated reports are usually retained longer, typically at least
until the child victim has reached adulthood.”).
87. See, e.g., In re W.B.M., 690 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
88. Id. at 49; Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1001 (2d Cir. 1994). See also
Hafemeister, supra note 49, at 897 (summarizing critiques of child protection
registries).
89. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1003–04.
90. Id.
91. See John O’Brien, NY Denied Thousands Accused of Child Abuse the Chance To
Clear Their Name, POST-STANDARD, Mar. 22, 2010, http://www.syracuse.com/
news/index.ssf/2010/03/ny_denied_thousands_accused_of.html (describing long
delays which led state officials to shred administrative requests).
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thereby placed on a child protection registry92 or if she is deemed to
have failed in protecting her children from an abusive boyfriend she
subsequently left, preventing that woman from becoming a school bus
driver or child care worker does not protect children at all.  Rather,
placing and keeping that mother on the child protection registry only
imposes an economic burden on that mother and limits her ability to
care for her children, thus hurting the very children whom the child
protection system is designed to help.
Fourth, the present child protection system removes many children
who could be adequately protected from abuse or neglect at home.
Over recent decades, many commentators have argued that the child
protection system removes children unnecessarily.93  One can infer
this conclusion from publicly reported data.  For instance, states re-
ported that 35% of all children removed from their families and placed
in foster care are “nonvictims”—that is, ultimately deemed to not have
been victims of abuse or neglect.94  In addition, a very large percent-
age of children removed from their homes leave foster care in less than
six months—67,522 in 2011, or 26.8% of all the children whom states
removed and placed in foster care that year.95  It is reasonable to infer
that many, if not most, children who could return to their families so
quickly were never at such a high risk as to justify a removal in the
first instance.  One state child protection agency recently acknowl-
edged that the majority of children who enter and leave foster care in
short periods of time “should have never come into care” in the first
instance.96
Other recent studies show that many children removed from their
families are harmed more by the state placing them in foster care than
similarly at-risk children left at home with their families.  Joseph
Doyle compared children removed from their families and placed in
foster care with children with similarly troubled family situations
whom CPS authorities nonetheless left at home.  Doyle found that
children placed in foster care had higher juvenile delinquency rates,
higher teen birth rates, and lower earnings than children left at
92. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 997.
93. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family’s
Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (2000); Marsha Garrison,
Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75
GEO. L.J. 1745 (1987); Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected”
Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975).
94. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra note 45, at 91.
95. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
96. The State of Arkansas so acknowledged in a recent federal filing. TITLE IV-E
WAIVER DEMONSTRATION PROJECT PROPOSAL 14, ARK. DIV. OF CHILD. & FAMILY
SERVS. (2012), available at http://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/programs_
fund/ar_waiver_proposal.pdf.
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home.97  The negative effects could last into adulthood; Doyle found
that children removed from their parents and placed in foster care for
any length of time were two to three times more likely to be arrested,
convicted, and imprisoned for crimes as adults than similarly at-risk
children left with their parents.98  An earlier study found that young
children moved from the custody of mothers who abused cocaine had
worse behavioral problems than those children left with similar
mothers.99  Unnecessary removals from families and placement in fos-
ter care impose both the traumas of separating children from their
parents100 and the harms associated with foster care itself, including
the toll of frequent moves from one foster home to another101 and the
long-term harms of remaining in foster care for years102—a too-com-
mon fate.103
Removals may also harm children by catalyzing parents’ “down-
ward spiral.”104  A study of New York City foster children whose time
97. Joseph J. Doyle, Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of
Foster Care, 97 AMER. ECON. REV. 1583, 1607 & n.2 (2007), available at http://
www.mit.edu/~jjdoyle/fostercare_aer.pdf (and sources cited therein).
98. Joseph J. Doyle, Child Protection and Adult Crime: Using Investigator Assign-
ment to Estimate Causal Effects of Foster Care, 116 J. POL. ECON. 746, 748 (2008),
available at http://www.mit.edu/~jjdoyle/doyle_jpe_aug08.pdf.
99. Virginia Delaney-Black et al., Teacher-Assessed Behavior of Children Prenatally
Exposed to Cocaine, 106 PEDIATRICS 782, 786 (2000).  The study controlled for
factors which might explain custody decisions, such as prenatal risk factors, and
still found that “custody change . . . was a significant predictor” of behavioral
problems. See also Kathleen Wobie et al., To Have and to Hold: A Descriptive
Study of Custody Status Following Prenatal Exposure to Cocaine, 43 PEDIATRIC
RES. 234 (1998), available at http://www.nature.com/pr/journal/v43/n4s/full/
pr19981518a.html (finding worse developmental outcomes for substance-exposed
infants placed out of their mothers’ custody than those living in their mothers’
custody at six months of age).
100. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 41–45 (1996).
101. E. Christopher Lloyd & Richard P. Barth, Developmental Outcomes After Five
Years for Foster Children Returned Home, Remaining in Care, or Adopted, 33
CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1383, 1384 (2011).  The prevalence of placement
changes is quite high.  For instance, the District of Columbia government re-
ported that it moved 38% of all foster children in 2011 from one placement to
another.  Many of these children had multiple placement changes, as there were
86% more total placement changes than children who experienced placement
changes. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, CHILD & FAMILY SERVS., D.C. GOV’T, ANNUAL
PUBLIC REPORT FY 2011, 28 (2012), available at http://cfsa.dc.gov/publication/an-
nual-report-2011-cfsa (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).
102. See, e.g., Lloyd & Barth, supra note 101 (finding that children who remained in
foster care after five years had significantly worse outcomes than those who ei-
ther returned home or were adopted).
103. According to the most recent federal data, more than 78,000 children—20% of the
total foster care population—had been in foster care for three or more years. AF-
CARS REPORT, supra note 61, at 2 (2012).
104. TIMOTHY ROSS ET AL., HARD DATA ON HARD TIMES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
MATERNAL INCARCERATION, FOSTER CARE, AND VISITATION 14 (2004), available at
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in foster care overlapped with their mothers’ incarceration found that
the child protection agency’s decision to remove children from parents
and place them in foster care correlated with increased criminal activ-
ity by their mothers.105  This criminal activity was mostly nonviolent,
with 56% of all such activity drug-related.106  Losing a child to foster
care may push parents into desperation and leads many parents with
substance-abuse problems to use more drugs because it removes a key
motivator for keeping substance abuse in check—the need to keep
themselves together for their children.107  The study concludes that
reducing the number of children removed into foster care can serve to
prevent maternal criminal activity.108  That conclusion may be too
modest; unnecessary removals of children not only represent a failure
to offer a less invasive option to parents, but can be so traumatizing
for the parent that later efforts at rehabilitation are significantly more
difficult.109
Even when removals are justified, little evidence exists that foster
care serves children’s needs.  “[T]here have been no randomised con-
trolled trials comparing out-of-home with in-home care on the child’s
safety, health, achievements, and quality of life.”110  A public health
approach demands data-driven decisions;111 so the absence of rigorous
data regarding the effectiveness of foster care is an essential fault of
the present system.
Fifth, the present system misses opportunities to solve real social
problems for some of society’s poorest and most vulnerable children
and families.  Half of all children reported to CPS are “screened out,”
more than three quarters of the remaining children are not the sub-
jects of substantiated allegations, and more than 90% of the remain-
ing children stay at home.  Many of these families have deep
problems, but the child welfare system does largely nothing for
them.112  Most families receive no services113 or “little more than a
referral to possible services or no more than six months of in-home
http://www.vera.org/pubs/hard-data-hard-times-empirical-analysis-maternal-in-
carceration-foster-care-and-visitation (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).
105. Id. at 10, 14.
106. Id. at 10–11, 14.
107. SHEIGLA MURPHY & MARSHA ROSENBAUM, PREGNANT WOMEN ON DRUGS: COMBAT-
ING STEREOTYPES AND STIGMA 9–10 (1999).
108. ROSS ET AL., supra note 104 (executive summary).
109. For a fuller critique of intersections between incarceration and foster care, see
Roberts, supra note 27.
110. Gilbert et al., supra note 48, at 326.
111. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
112. See Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America’s Responses
to Troubled and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1453 n.644 (2005).
113. FRED WULCZYN ET AL., BEYOND COMMON SENSE: CHILD WELFARE, CHILD WELL-
BEING, AND THE EVIDENCE FOR POLICY REFORM 86 (2005).
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services.”114  CPS authorities have unique knowledge of families’ core
needs and thus unique opportunities to help families address those
needs.  And the evidence makes plain that, in the aggregate, children
and families who come to the attention of CPS authorities have a
range of serious needs.115  For instance, the majority of young chil-
dren involved in any way with CPS agencies are at high risk of devel-
opmental delays; even cases closed after an investigation reveal
“exceptionally high . . . developmental risk.”116  But problems that ex-
isted when child-welfare agencies made contact with them are not re-
solved several years later, even when the families present problems
for which interventions known to be effective exist.117  Some of these
families have their problems progress to a point at which child-protec-
tion agencies must intervene more coercively.  The child-welfare liter-
ature is replete with repeat cases of child maltreatment.118  Many
more of these families simply continue on, their problems festering
and leading to poor life outcomes, even poorer than for children from
similar socio-economic backgrounds.119  These families include those
that have problems sufficiently serious to trigger suspicion of mal-
treatment by a mandatory reporter but that a reporter chooses not to
report (in violation of mandatory reporting laws)—a decision that cor-
relates, unsurprisingly, with less severe suspicions.120  These children
114. Richard P. Barth, Research Outcomes of Prenatal Substance Exposure and the
Need to Review Policies and Procedures Regarding Child Abuse Reporting, 80
CHILD WELFARE 275, 282 (2001).  Barth suggests that this limited set of likely
interventions renders CPS hotline calls as something other than punishment. Id.
As argued above, such a perspective ignores the stigma of CPS involvement, the
invasiveness of a CPS investigation, the stigma of a substantiated finding, and
the economic harm of the state placing one’s name on a child protection registry.
115. See WULCZYN et al., supra note 113, at 86 (“Children who are entering child wel-
fare services are clearly in need of a range of supportive activities. . . . [Their
background] would seem to predict futures beset with significant health and
mental health problems.”).
116. Id. at 172.  For example, two- and three-year-old children involved with CPS have
twice the average amount of problematic behavior. Id.
117. Abraham B. Bergman, Child Protective Services Has Outlived Its Usefulness, 10
ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 978, 978–79 (2010); Kristine A. Camp-
bell et al., Household, Family and Child Risk Factors After an Investigation for
Suspected Child Maltreatment: A Missed Opportunity for Prevention, 10
ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 943 (2010).
118. JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION 27 (1998).
119. Wald, supra note 78, at 16 (“[S]everal longitudinal studies have found that the
long-term development of children reported to CPS agencies, regardless of
whether the report is substantiated, is considerably worse than the development
of children from similar socio-economic households and neighborhoods who have
not been reported to CPS.”); see also id. at 22 (“[B]ecoming known to the CPS
system does not lead to improved well-being for most of [sic] children . . . .”).
120. Stephen W. Webster et al., Overreporting and Underreporting of Child Abuse:
Teachers’ Use of Professional Discretion, 29 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1281, 1293
(2005).
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may be spared some of the difficulties caused by CPS interventions,
but they receive no interventions to address whatever may be occur-
ring in their family lives.
This absence of help for families whose parents are not deemed bad
enough for greater child-protection-system involvement is a symptom
of the broader system design problem.  By framing child maltreatment
as an issue of pathological parents, the law has created an unhelpful
binary—either a parent is acceptable or the parent commits maltreat-
ment.121  Child protection authorities generally provide no services to
any parent in the former category or too many in the latter.  This legal
binary does not comport with the level of risk to children.  Substanti-
ating abuse or neglect is essential to operating the present parental
fault model; if a CPS agency cannot prove abuse or neglect, it has no
authority to proceed.  But, beyond the most severe cases, such sub-
stantiation bears little connection to the actual risk faced by children.
One detailed study, comparing cases in which CPS agencies substanti-
ated maltreatment allegations but did not remove children with cases
in which CPS did not substantiate maltreatment allegations, found
similar future risk to children in both groups.122
C. Public Health Paradigm
A public health approach would differ from the existing model by
focusing on parental fault and related coercive investigations and
other interventions in a much narrower range of cases.  It would de-
velop a legal structure that would lead individuals and institutions
with significant contact with children and families to make more effec-
tive service referrals.  It would make decisions based on the best data
available, after analyzing children’s complete family and social
environment.
Outlining the core principles of a public health approach requires
explanation because the public health field does not use the term with
great precision; one introductory textbook admits that public health
“is an abstract concept, hard to pin down.”123  While the field histori-
121. Michael S. Wald, Taking the Wrong Message: The Legacy of the Identification of
the Battered Child Syndrome, in C. HENRY KEMPE: A 50 YEAR LEGACY TO THE
FIELD OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 16, at 89, 90.
122. Patricia L. Kohl et al., Time to Leave Substantiation Behind: Findings from a
National Probability Study, 14 CHILD MALTREATMENT 17, 23 (2009).
123. MARY-JANE SCHNEIDER, INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC HEALTH xix (3d ed. 2011). See
also BERNARD J. TURNOCK, PUBLIC HEALTH: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 9 (4th
ed. 2009) (listing several definitions of public health).  An oft-cited federal report
offers this imprecise definition: “the fulfillment of society’s interest in assuring
the conditions in which people can be healthy.” INST. OF MED., COMM. FOR THE
STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 40
(1988), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/1091_html. See also Wendy K.
Mariner, Review Essay, Public Health and Law: Past and Future Visions, 28 J.
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cally focused on infectious diseases, it has expanded to include child
maltreatment and many of its underlying risk factors, like mental
health and substance abuse.124  Indeed, multiple legal, social work,
and public health commentators and institutions125 have recognized
that child maltreatment is a public health issue.  This Article builds
off of their work, recognizing that the law has shaped the existing pa-
rental-fault paradigm and could shape a public health approach.126
This work, however, does not yet discuss the legal reforms neces-
sary for a public health approach—especially when significant risk
factors exist or maltreatment has already occurred.  Multiple com-
mentators have used a public health lens to criticize the present child
welfare system.127  But they only open the conversation, suggesting a
more rigorous welfare state and social safety net without addressing
how to respond to families with multiple risk factors of child maltreat-
ment or parents who have already maltreated their children.128  One
commentator, for instance, urges greater investment in a “comprehen-
sive prevention strategy,” especially expansion of primary prevention
programs like early childhood programs and the use of mental-health
and substance-abuse screenings for parents of young children, fol-
lowed by evidence-based treatments for specific conditions.129  Calls
for a stronger safety net—what public health calls primary preven-
tion—are relatively easy analytically and unite otherwise divergent
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 525, 525–28 (2003) (describing varied and broad defini-
tions of public health).
124. ROGER DETELS ET AL., OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH: CURRENT SCOPE AND
CONCERNS IN PUBLIC HEALTH § 1.1 (4th ed. 2004).
125. CHILD MALTREATMENT SURVEILLANCE: UNIFORM DEFINITIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
AND RECOMMENDED DATA ELEMENTS 4, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2008), available at http://www.
cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/cm_surveillance-a.pdf.
126. Scott Burris et al., Making the Case for Laws that Improve Health: A Framework
for Public Health Law Research, 88 MILLBANK Q. 169, 170 (2010).
127. For instance, Martin Guggenheim concludes a sharp critique of the modern child
welfare system by stating “If we could start over and conceive of child welfare as
a public health or shared social problem . . . we could develop policies that ad-
dress directly and proactively those conditions that adversely affect the health
and welfare of poor children in the United States.” MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S
WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 211 (2005); see also Appell, supra note 39, at 298
(calling for “a social justice or a public health approach” that would seek to im-
prove social, economic, and mental health of children and parents and avoid
removals).
128. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 127, at 211.
129. Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 590, 621–30 (2005); see also Francie Zimmerman & James
A. Mercy, A Better Start: Child Maltreatment as a Public Health Priority, ZERO TO
THREE, May 2010, at 4, 8–9, available at http://www.zerotothree.org/maltreat-
ment/child-abuse-neglect/30-5-zimmerman.pdf (calling for various prevention ef-
forts as a public health strategy).
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approaches.130  It is hard to object, for instance, to increased screening
for conditions that are risk factors for abuse and neglect like parental
depression,131 to voluntary programs offered to entire populations
with a strong evidence base132 of preventing child maltreatment and
saving long-term costs,133 or to greater federal funding for research
into public health tools and evidence-based services.134  The harder
130. For instance, Elizabeth Bartholet sharply disagrees with Guggenheim over how
many children should be removed and how quickly and aggressively parental
rights should be terminated. Compare Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Chil-
dren: Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1716 (2000), with ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEG-
LECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999), and Elizabeth
Bartholet, Reply, Whose Children? A Response to Professor Guggenheim, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1999 (2000).  Bartholet also calls for “universal home visitation or
some comparable program designed to provide families with support and children
with protection during the vital periods of pregnancy and early infancy.”
BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN, supra, at 239; see also Elizabeth Bartholet, Cre-
ating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: Effective Early Intervention to Pre-
vent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1323, 1338
(2012) (discussing the discretion of courts and child protective services in low-risk
cases that do not necessitate coercive CPS action such as removal and termina-
tion of parental rights).
131. See, e.g., Sheila Smith, Public Health Approaches to Child and Parent Screening:
Implications for Child Protection, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 59 (2012) (explaining how in-
creased screening for maternal depression can aid child welfare).  Congress pro-
vided funding for such screening in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2952, 124 Stat. 119, 226–28 (2010) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 712).
132. Programs with a strong evidence base are rare, and one is well-cautioned against
an overly broad proposal. See, e.g., Michael S. Wald, Preventing Maltreatment or
Promoting Positive Development—Where Should a Community Focus Its Re-
sources?, in PREVENTING CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 47, at 182, 186
(describing the relative paucity of programs with such a strong evidence base).
133. See, e.g., WULCZYN et al., supra note 113, at 141 (recommending “funding and
implementation of prevention programs for families of young children who are at
risk of or identified with maltreatment” as a means of reducing abuse and neglect
and the need for coercive CPS interventions and describing some of the features
of evidence-based programs).
134. Garrison, supra note 129, at 633.  Nurse home-visiting programs provide an ex-
ample.  Nurses regularly visit first-time, young, poor mothers during pregnancy
and for two years after birth and help identify and resolve various needs, result-
ing in reduced child maltreatment (and other various social problems) and emer-
gency room visits, and, through such reductions, saving money.  The RAND
Corporation found that the program saves $5.70 for every dollar spent on high-
risk families and $1.26 for every dollar spent on low-risk families. M. REBECCA
KILBURN & LYNN KAROLY, THE ECONOMICS OF EARLY CHILDHOOD POLICY: WHAT
THE DISMAL SCIENCE HAS TO SAY ABOUT INVESTING IN Children 16 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/
RAND_OP227.pdf; see also David L. Olds et al., Preventing Child Abuse and Neg-
lect with Home Visiting by Nurses, in PREVENTING CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra
note 47, at 29, 40 (describing a study in which low-income mothers visited by
nurses during and after pregnancy showed dramatically reduced rates of sickness
and child maltreatment than similar mothers who did not receive in-home visits).
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question is how to reform child welfare law to apply a public health
approach in secondary and tertiary prevention situations.
The social science literature is more vague than the legal litera-
ture.  Abraham Bergman recommends replacing much of our current
child protection reporting and investigation infrastructure with an
army of public health nurses who will provide services “to at-risk fam-
ilies before the occurrence of abuse or neglect.”135  Bergman then con-
cedes that his proposal faces significant obstacles—fiscal constraints
and the shortage of public health nurses136—and does not describe
the legal reforms necessary to achieve it.  Other articles articulate a
philosophical grounding for a public health approach to child mal-
treatment,137 articulate the value of a public health approach,138 con-
ceptualize primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention,139 identify
specific programs that seem to reduce risk factors for child abuse and
neglect,140 and call for more “urgent development” of services for par-
ents to prevent child abuse and neglect.141  All offer important contri-
butions but lack calls for specific legal reforms.
This Article does not intend to be overly critical of this existing
research.  Many authors discussed acknowledge the work that re-
mains: Marsha Garrison, for instance, notes the “massive research ef-
fort” that building a public health approach requires.142  Others
acknowledge that the “knowledge base for a public health approach to
child abuse and neglect is still in its infancy.”143  Rather, this Article
points out the large amount of legal reforms necessary to structure a
public health approach to child welfare, and the imprecisely defined
contours of a public health approach.
A public health approach would address child welfare differently
than the present parental-fault paradigm.  For purposes of this Arti-
135. Bergman, supra note 117, at 978–79.
136. Id.; Abraham B. Bergman, A Pediatrician’s Perspective on Child Protection, in C.
HENRY KEMPE: A 50 YEAR LEGACY TO THE FIELD OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
supra note 16, at 68.
137. Richard Reading et al., Promotion of Children’s Rights and Prevention of Child
Maltreatment, 373 THE LANCET 332 (2009).
138. E.g., Melissa O’Donnell et al., Child Abuse and Neglect—Is It Time for a Public
Health Approach?, 32 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PUB. HEALTH 325 (2008).
139. Id. at 328. See also Cathryn Hunter, Defining the Public Health Model for the
Child Welfare Services Context, NAT’L CHILD PROTECTION CLEARINGHOUSE (Sept.
2011), available at http://www.aifs.gov.au/nch/pubs/sheets/rs11/rs11.pdf (outlin-
ing the three levels of public health programs for addressing child maltreatment).
140. Jane Barlow & Rachel Calam, A Public Health Approach to Safeguarding in the
21st Century, 20 CHILD ABUSE REV. 238, 245–49 (2011) (describing the British
Healthy Child Programme and the American Triple P Parenting program).
141. Gilbert et al., supra note 48, at 338.
142. Garrison, supra note 129, at 630.
143. O’Donnell et al., supra note 138, at 327; see also Gilbert, et al., supra note 48, at
339 (calling for development of a stronger research agenda).
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cle, a “public health approach to child welfare” includes the following
elements:
First, a public health approach seeks to apply the most effective
interventions and to apply the most invasive interventions only when
necessary.  Its goal is to achieve the best health outcomes, broadly de-
fined, for children and families.  Assigning fault or blame or using gov-
ernment’s coercive powers may be called for, but only when necessary
to achieve a health outcome because public health recognizes that in-
dividual freedoms are important and that unnecessary infringements
on those freedoms can reduce the public’s faith in public health
efforts.144
Second, a public health approach considers children in their full
context—as parts of families and wider communities.  The public
health field insists on considering the social environment in which a
health problem exists, applying an “ecological” analysis.145  Such an
analysis is consistent with prevailing child development theories,
which identify environmental factors beyond parents and other family
members as essential elements of children’s well-being.146  A public
health approach thus must at least consider interventions that ad-
dress that environment—an approach that necessarily shifts blame
off of individuals.147  Parents who mistreat their children are not nec-
essarily “degenerate.”  Rather, they are likely “enmeshed in a web of
problems” including their own mental health conditions, poverty, and
their children’s behavioral issues.148  In addition, a public health ap-
proach may seek to preserve or strengthen the positive elements of a
child’s environment and use them to help improve the environment’s
harmful elements.149
Third, a public health approach relies on data to identify the most
effective interventions available, and invests in research to identify
such interventions.150  This principle ensures, as much as is possible,
that authorities choose interventions based on what is most likely to
work rather than political pressures to err on the side of interven-
144. Jonathan Todres, Moving Upstream: The Merits of a Public Health Law Approach
to Human Trafficking, 89 N.C. L. REV. 447, 500 (2011).
145. TURNOCK, supra note 123, at 47–86; SCHNEIDER, supra note 123, at 233 (“An eco-
logical model looks at how the social environment, including interpersonal, or-
ganization, community, and public policy factors, supports and maintains
unhealthy behaviors.”) Id.
146. WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 113, at 10.
147. SCHNEIDER, supra note 123, at 226. See also infra notes 166–67 and accompany-
ing text (describing Barbara Bennett Woodhouse’s “environmentalist paradigm”
for analyzing children’s cases, supra note 11).
148. Gilbert, supra note 20, at 232.
149. See Melton, supra note 47 (describing one such effort and its positive outcome
data).
150. Garrison, supra note 129, at 599–611 (2005); WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 113, at
42–43.
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tion151 or flawed decision-making processes that can result from emo-
tionally charged issues such as child maltreatment.152  Marsha
Garrison has established how our child welfare system lacks proven,
standardized diagnostic tools and evidence-based treatments.153  A re-
cent federal review identified an “urgent need” to fill “major substan-
tive and methodological gaps in the evidence” for interventions to help
maltreated children.154
Fourth, a public health approach focuses on prevention as prefera-
ble to reactive interventions155 and offers a continuum of interven-
tions depending on the level of risk that child maltreatment of any
kind will occur.  The field categorizes efforts into primary, secondary,
and tertiary prevention.156  Primary prevention seeks to prevent peo-
ple’s exposure to risk factors for child maltreatment by providing some
intervention to a wide population.  Secondary prevention seeks to re-
duce the risk of harm by eliminating or mitigating risk factors that
are already present through services targeted at families in which cer-
tain risk factors are present.  Tertiary prevention “seeks to minimize
disability” through interventions after maltreatment has occurred157
and recognizes that maltreatment often does not lead to perceptible
harm to a child’s development.158  Public health importantly includes
a response to past child maltreatment as tertiary prevention—the idea
151. See Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Re-
movals in Child Protection Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 459 (2003)
(describing CPS agencies overresponding to highly publicized tragedies or operat-
ing based on fear of liability).
152. Melissa Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the Institutional
Culture of Family Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink The-
ory, 34 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 78–79 (2010).
153. See Garrison, supra note 129. See also LINDSEY, supra note 17, at 40 n.21
(“[C]hild welfare had not built an empirically validated knowledge base . . . .”); id.
at 168 (discussing child welfare’s inadequate knowledge base in assessing the
need for in-home versus out-of-home care); Edward Zigler, Controlling Child
Abuse in America: An Effort Doomed to Failure, in CHILD ABUSE AND VIOLENCE 39
(David G. Gil ed., 1979) (calling for “the development of the knowledge base that
is a prerequisite for cost-effective interventions”).
154. CHILD EXPOSURE TO TRAUMA: COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERVENTIONS AD-
DRESSING MALTREATMENT 15–16, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AGENCY
FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (2013), available at  http://effectivehealthcare.
ahrq.gov/ehc/products/298/1463/trauma-interventions-maltreatment-child-execu-
tive-130415.pdf.
155. Jonathon Todres, Addressing Public Health Strategies for Advancing Child Pro-
tection: Human Trafficking as a Case Study, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 93, 103 (2012);
WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 113, at 43.
156. For summaries of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention, see SCHNEIDER,
supra  note 123, at 12; TURNOCK, supra note 123, at 112–14.
157. SCHNEIDER, supra note 123, at 12.
158. James Garbarino, The Emotionally Battered Child, in C. HENRY KEMPE: A 50
YEAR LEGACY TO THE FIELD OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 16, at 57,
59.
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is that further episodes of maltreatment can be prevented, that less
serious instances demand some effective intervention “before [they]
advance[ ] to serious consequences,”159 and, by implication, that pre-
vention services rather than invasive government actions are often
the best responses to acts of maltreatment.
Fifth, a public health approach offers a continuum of interventions
based on the severity of the child maltreatment at issue, and it applies
invasive and coercive interventions only when necessary.  This ele-
ment is consistent with existing practice—at least as described—
which calls for meaningful services to be offered to families before re-
moval occurs.160  Responding to physical abuse that has caused an in-
jury requiring medical attention requires a different and more
invasive form of tertiary prevention than responding to a child’s be-
havioral problems that result from his mother’s neglect as his mother
deals with an untreated mental health condition.  Because the goal is
to “minimize disability”161 and prevent or reduce harm as much as
possible,162 an intervention that is itself harmful—such as removing a
child from his home—is only indicated when the likely harm of stay-
ing in the home is greater than the harm from the removal.  This anal-
ysis is analogous to the medical maxim of “do no harm”—or, at least,
analogous with the goal of choosing an intervention that causes the
least amount of harm possible.163
A public health approach would complement, not contradict, the
legal rights focus of child custody disputes—that is, that a parent has
a right to custody of his or her child until the parent is proven unfit or
otherwise at fault.  Indeed, a public health model is infused with the
values of the traditional rights model: the latter values children’s and
parents’ right to family integrity and seeks to balance that right with
the need for state intervention to protect children against familial
abuse.164  The value of a contextual view of children is that it can
more accurately weigh the value of a child’s relationship with her par-
ents and, secondarily, other key figures in her life.  Such valuation
should limit state removals of children—because it will only be justi-
fied when the harm of removing the child is less than the harm the
child endured in her environment and when no less invasive creative
solution based on the full context of her life is viable.  A public health
analysis thus maximizes children’s and parents’ liberty because it lim-
159. Webster, supra note 120, at 1282.
160. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
161. SCHNEIDER, supra note 123, at 12.
162. Todres, supra note 144, at 453.
163. Albert J. Solnit, Child Abuse: Least Harmful, Most Protective Intervention, 65 PE-
DIATRICS 170, 171 (1980).
164. See id. (imposing the “least harmful” intervention is “compatible . . . with the
constitutional model of maximizing the autonomy of parents and minimizing the
intrusions into family privacy”).
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its unnecessary state coercion and maximizes the state’s ability to pro-
tect children by more effectively preventing abuse and neglect and
because it frees CPS agencies to focus on the most severe forms of
maltreatment.  That is, a public health approach better reflects the
constitutional values inherent in the traditional rights model.165
This complementary view is at odds with some in the field.  Bar-
bara Bennett Woodhouse advocates an “environmentalist paradigm”
focusing on the full context of a child “rather than the child/parent/
state triangle reflected in constitutional doctrine.”166  She summa-
rizes her proposed paradigm in language consistent with this Article’s:
“Protecting endangered children requires us to see them not only as
persons in their own right but also components in the inter-linked web
of nature.”167  Woodhouse then asserts that such contextual under-
standing of children “involves rejecting” a paradigm that views chil-
dren and families “primarily in terms of individual rights.”168  But it
is not clear why such rejection is required.  Woodhouse posits that an
ecological model would not seek to terminate parental rights of a teen-
ager who has a functioning, even if state-created, “ecosystem” of a sta-
ble foster home willing to keep him until he is an adult and a parent
who visits regularly and to whom he is bonded.169  This example
poorly illustrates rejecting a rights-based approach because the courts
have already significantly shuffled legal rights regarding the child—
the parent and child lost the right to live together, and the state
gained the right to place the child in a foster home.  A rights-based
model should reach the same result—the child has a right to a rela-
tionship with his mother, however flawed she may be, unless strong
evidence can show why she is unfit and why terminating the
mother–child relationship is in the child’s best interests, considering
the child in his full ecosystem.
165. This view is similar to that of scholars like Clare Huntington, who argued that a
rights framework is important but that it should be shifted “to the background
(although not out of the picture entirely) in favor of a holistic, problem-solving
model.”  Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV.
637, 641 (2006).
166. Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 412 (internal quotations omitted).
167. Id. at 434.
168. Id.  Others criticize the existing rights triad, though they frame their prescrip-
tions as additions to rather than replacements for that triad.  For example, Sasha
Coupet argues that the legal rights framework should recognize the rights of sig-
nificant adult caretakers who are not parents.  Sasha Coupet, Neither Dyad nor
Triad: Children’s Relationship Interests within Kinship Caregiving Families, 41
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 77, 85 (2007).
169. Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 443–44.
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III. LIMITING THE COERCIVE INTERVENTION BY
REFORMING REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION LAWS
Legal reforms to create a public health approach should begin by
limiting the scope of the present invasive and coercive child protection
system and, conversely, expanding options for providing services
through more voluntary programs.  These steps will apply the paren-
tal-fault paradigm to a narrower range of cases, those in which the
severity of abuse or neglect or harm to a child necessitates such an
approach, and will thus enable child protection agencies to focus more
effectively on those cases while reducing legal barriers to other insti-
tutions serving other families more effectively.
This section addresses two legal pillars of the current system that
require reform: mandatory reporting and mandatory investigation
statutes that, on their own and, especially, in conjunction, inhibit a
public health approach by directing millions of families to a coercive
and ineffective system and blocking a more nuanced approach.
Consider a 13-year-old child attending the sixth grade in an urban
middle school.  The child has been held back once already, performs
academically at the fourth grade, and frequently misbehaves, leading
to multiple detentions and one- to five-day suspensions.  The child
lives with her mother, who has just lost her job.  The family’s home is
their third in two years.  Since the child’s father was incarcerated
three years ago, the family’s income has declined, and they have not
been able to keep up on rent.  A school social worker calls home to tell
the child’s mother of her latest suspension and convinces the mother
to come into the school for a meeting to address the child’s behavior.
At the meeting, the social worker observes what she thinks are symp-
toms of clinical depression from the mother.  The mother says to her
daughter, “I don’t know what to do.  You keep doing this, you keep
getting whuppings, and you keep doing it again.  I guess I’ll have to
whup you harder.”  The social worker later talks to the child, who says
that a “whupping” involves being hit on the buttocks by a belt or ex-
tension cord.  The child says, “It’s OK.  She only does it when I’m bad.”
She says she does not know if the whuppings leave marks and that the
whuppings hurt while they happen but not afterwards.  The social
worker is concerned about more corporal punishment due to the
child’s school punishment and that the mother’s possible depression
could prevent her from dealing as effectively as possible with the
child’s behavior problems.170
Under the current paradigm, this situation may trigger a call to
the child protection hotline by the school social worker and an investi-
170. This hypothetical is a composite case of teenage clients whom I have represented
over the years, coupled with incidents relayed to me from staff at various schools
and child protective social workers.
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gation by the child welfare agency.  The child is unlikely to be removed
from the home due to the lack of any present injury on the child, and
the abuse allegation may not even be substantiated.  As we know from
data discussed above, the family’s situation is unlikely to be helped by
the child welfare system’s involvement.  This section will argue that
the status quo is the antithesis of a public health approach because it
calls a family to the attention of the wrong agency, which will invade
the family’s privacy and not help the family.  Moreover, the status quo
impedes those individuals and entities that could do something more
effective and fulfill public health’s preventative goals.  Advocates for a
public health approach have explicitly called for a better “balance” be-
tween CPS responses to child maltreatment and actions by a variety
of professionals and community members with the ability to help chil-
dren and families.171  But our child welfare system cannot establish
such a balance when the law frames every reasonable suspicion of
abuse or neglect as grounds for CPS intervention.
Accordingly, this section recommends reforms to both mandatory
reporting statutes and mandatory investigation statutes and recom-
mends the establishment of voluntary pathways to offering assistance
to vulnerable families that do not pose a significant risk to their chil-
dren’s safety.
A. Mandatory Reporting Statutes
The present child welfare parental-fault paradigm and mandatory
reporting laws were developed for the worst cases—parents who se-
verely abuse their children.  Legal reforms to promote a public health
approach would repeal those laws or greatly narrow their scope.
Dr. C. Henry Kempe identified “battered child syndrome” in 1962,
and his research and public policy responses have largely shaped our
modern child welfare system, especially its present focus on individual
bad actors whose pathologies, rather than social problems, lead them
to abuse children.172  Kempe and his colleagues’ writing served to ar-
ticulate many of the key elements of the child welfare system that re-
main to this day—especially mandatory reporting statutes and
thorough investigations of all reports of child maltreatment.173  In one
of the swiftest adoptions of significant social reform in American his-
171. Zimmerman & Mercy, supra note 129, at 6.
172. WALDFOGEL, supra note 118, at 139; MURRAY LEVINE ET AL., THE IMPACT OF MAN-
DATED REPORTING ON THE THERAPEUTIC PROCESS: PICKING UP THE PIECES 5 (1995).
For a narrative of Kempe’s work and impact, see Hafemeister, supra note 49, at
838–41.
173. See M.G. Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD 153,
162–73 (Ray E. Helfer & C. Henry Kempe eds., 2d ed. 1972) (positively describing
the mandatory reporting and investigation structures that became the norm by
the 1970s).
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tory, every state adopted mandatory reporting statutes within five
years of Dr. Kempe’s first battered child syndrome article.174  They
now require a wide swath of professionals and, in eighteen states, all
people, to report to CPS any time they have reasonable suspicion that
a parent has abused or neglected a child.175
Strikingly, Kempe and his colleagues advocated for narrower laws
than soon became the national norm.  For instance, they advocated
that mandatory reporting should be limited to physicians, who would
be the professionals most likely to encounter children suffering from
severe physical abuse.176  And physicians would likely only need to
report serious injuries that the doctor concluded were not likely acci-
dental; they reasoned that reporting other injuries would be an “unec-
onomic” use of child protection resources.177  Their goal was to
identify the most severe forms of child abuse, which they anticipated
would number in the thousands.178  The parental-fault paradigm in-
herent in the mandatory reporting and investigating laws advocated
by Kempe and his allies makes sense for these severe cases.  By enact-
ing a mandatory reporting requirement as a condition for federal
funding, Congress followed Kempe’s focus on the most severe cases.
Congress imposed reporting and investigation requirements in the
most severe cases and did not develop a comprehensive treatment sys-
tem.179  State laws soon expanded, however, not only to include severe
abuse, but also to require CPS reports whenever a mandatory reporter
had a reasonable suspicion that any form of abuse or neglect had
occurred.
174. Hafemeister, supra note 49, at 840.
175. Id. at 853–55. The present debate is at the margins—for instance, whether
mediators in family court cases or social workers employed by lawyers ought to be
covered by mandatory reporting statutes.  Art Hinshaw, Mediators as Mandatory
Reporters of Child Abuse: Preserving Mediation’s Core Values, 34 FLA. ST. L. REV.
271 (2007); Alexis Anderson et al., Professional Ethics in Interdisciplinary Col-
laboratives: Zeal, Paternalism and Mandated Reporting, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 659,
690–717 (2006–07) (arguing for a mandatory reporter exception for social work-
ers working for lawyers).
176. Paulsen, supra note 173, at 162.
177. Id. at 164.
178. In his 1962 paper, Kempe identified 302 “battered child syndrome” cases in hos-
pitals and 447 in courts based on incomplete surveys.  Kempe et al., supra note
15, at 17.
179. Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in Public
Family Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency System, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 1397, 1434 (1999).
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Despite their omnipresent nature, their many supporters,180 and
their “sacrosanct” status,181 mandatory reporting laws have attracted
criticism for many years from across the child welfare political spec-
trum, especially because of their strikingly broad scope.182  This
American innovation has not spread far across the globe or even to all
countries with similar legal systems.  England, Scotland, and Wales
have no mandatory reporting statutes, and Northern Ireland only re-
quires reporting offenses which might lead to arrest—a narrower
range than the American requirement of reporting reasonable suspi-
cion of any form of child maltreatment, even that which does not qual-
ify as a crime.183  Comparisons with those countries suggests little
reason to believe that mandatory reporting helps authorities identify
a higher rate of the most severe cases or that it increases child safety
outcomes.184
The most damning critique of mandatory reporting is from Gary
Melton, who collects research showing that professionals who could
refer families to various support services did not do so when they were
subject to mandatory reporting statutes and, instead, only analyzed
whether those statutes applied.185  That analysis may lead them to
report or not—there is significant evidence that many choose not to
report, perhaps as many as choose to report186—and that choice
seems to be all that happens in far too many cases.  More anecdotal
studies also find that nonprofessionals often decline to report sus-
pected problems because they do not trust that child protection agen-
180. E.g., Ben Mathews & Donald C. Bross, Mandated Reporting Is Still a Policy with
Reason: Empirical Evidence and Philosophical Grounds, 32 CHILD ABUSE & NEG-
LECT 511 (2008); Brett Drake & Melissa Jonson-Reid, Commentary, A Response to
Melton Based on the Best Available Data, 31 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 343 (2007).
181. Melton, supra note 13, at 16.  Richard Gelles also uses religious imagery, describ-
ing criticism of mandatory reporting as “heretical.” RICHARD GELLES, THE BOOK
OF DAVID 154 (1996).
182. For a summary of critiques, see SETH C. KALICHMAN, MANDATED REPORTING OF
SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE: ETHICS, LAW, & POLICY 30–33 (2d ed. 1999).
183. WALLACE & BUNTING, supra note 20, at 4.  Wallace and Bunting found “few coun-
tries” to have mandatory reporting statutes, and some of those countries have
statutes with a narrower scope than American laws.  Id. at 4–5.
184. Comparing the United States and Britain, Jane Waldfogel found that the pri-
mary difference was that more reports of less severe neglect cases were made in
the United States and that, despite this relatively high level of reports, children
suffered less repeat maltreatment in Britain. WALDFOGEL, supra note 118, at 64.
185. Melton, supra note 13, at 14.
186. The federal government estimates that mandatory reporters are aware of, but do
not report, most of the uninvestigated maltreatment, which accounts for a major-
ity of all maltreated children.  NIS-4, supra note 79, at 8–21.  Even the eighteen
states that make every adult a mandatory reporter do not have increased rates of
child protection reports. REBECCA MCELROY, FIRST FOCUS, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE
LAWS REGARDING MANDATED REPORTING OF CHILD MALTREATMENT 3, http://www.
firstfocus.net/sites/default/files/An%20Analysis%20of%20State%20Laws%20Re-
garding%20Mandated%20Reporting%20of%20Child%20Maltreatment.pdf.
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cies will provide appropriately supportive responses.187  Relatedly,
Melton argues that mandatory reporting statutes give those who call
the hotline the false impression that they have done all they can for
the child and that child protection authorities will be able to monitor
families, thus deterring these individuals from pursuing potentially
more helpful interventions.188
Critics have also worried that the possibility of mandatory report-
ing “probably deters many families from seeking help” and disrupts
families’ participation in treatment.189  Treatment disruptions are
particularly evident with mental health care; one study reported that
24% of clients stopped treatment after a report by their treatment pro-
vider and that the rate was 31% when the clients themselves were the
alleged maltreater,190 and another reported a decrease in clients’ dis-
closures of abuse following enactment of mandatory reporting stat-
utes.  These disruptions make it more difficult to provide treatments
to prevent further abuse.191  A report by the National Center on Sub-
stance Abuse and Child Welfare concluded that “fear on the part of the
pregnant woman of punitive action and/or the possible loss of custody
of the child as a result of her drug use” is “[o]ne key reason” too few
women receive pre-natal care.192  Mandatory reporting also breaks
187. Dorothy Roberts interviewed twenty-five women in a largely black Chicago
neighborhood in which a disproportionate number of families were involved with
the local child protection agency.  One such woman explained why she would not
call the agency about a friend of hers with a substance-abuse problem, even
though she acknowledged that the friend ought to get into treatment and needed
help with her young children: “It would be on my conscience knowing that I made
this phone call and this girl probably never see her kids.”  Roberts, supra note 28,
at 130–32.
188. Melton, supra 13, at 13.
189. Id. at 14.
190. Holly Watson & Murray Levine, Pyschotherapy and Mandated Reporting of Child
Abuse, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 246, 252–53 (1989). Watson and Levine oddly
characterize their results as showing that mandatory reporting does not disrupt
treatment and that fears of the contrary are “unfounded.” Id. at 252.  Yet they
acknowledge that a “significant minority” of clients do stop treatment, id. at 253,
and that other factors, such as court orders to remain in treatment or fear of CPS
agencies’ responses to stop treatment, might explain why even more clients did
not stop. Id. at 254.  And Watson and Levine concede that they saw no data
showing that such hotline calls served to protect children or that CPS even fol-
lowed up with the therapist in most cases—that is, there was no documented
positive effect to counterbalance the documented negative effects. Id. at 254.
191. Id. (citing Fred S. Berlin et al., Effects of Statutes Requiring Psychiatrists to Re-
port Suspected Sexual Abuse of Children, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 449, 449–53
(1991)); see also KALICHMAN, supra note 182, at 58–59 (describing studies show-
ing how mandatory reporting statutes could decrease disclosures of past sexual
abuse by abusers seeking treatment in some clinical settings and studies showing
no effect in other settings).
192. SCREENING & ASSESSMENT FOR FAMILY ENGAGEMENT, RETENTION, AND RECOVERY
(SAFERR), C-8, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE &
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the confidentiality between a professional and a client, creating ethi-
cal dilemmas for many reporters193 and deterring reporting.
Even some advocates for more coercive government action see
mandatory reporting laws as counter-productive.  Consider Richard
Gelles, a critic of family preservation services and a lead proponent of
the Adoption of Safe Families Act, which increased the number of ter-
mination of parental rights cases and reduced the obligations on
states to make efforts to keep families together.194  Gelles argued as
early as 1996 that we should “eliminate mandatory reporting” because
it leads to disproportionately high reports regarding poor and minor-
ity families and because it “has overwhelmed the child protection sys-
tem to the point that it can barely conduct investigations and rarely
deliver meaningful and effective services.”195  Importantly for this Ar-
ticle’s purposes, Gelles recognizes that mandatory reporting require-
ments wrongly assume that the wide swath of professionals whom
they affect lack the desire or ability to address child maltreatment.196
Mandatory reporting statutes not only create the harms identified
by Gelles and Melton but prevent a more effective public health re-
sponse from taking shape.  Mandatory reporting laws direct the peo-
ple best suited to address a situation that they cannot and should not
address it but should simply call it in.  One example is drug and alco-
hol abuse by pregnant women.  The American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists has urged universal screening and referral to help
women recover from their addictions and emphasizes that a “climate
of respect and trust” between physician and patient rather than ac-
tions that “stigmatize” women is essential to intervening effectively.
Mandatory reporting laws create a “difficult dilemma” because they
erode confidentiality and trust and may deter women from disclosing
substance-abuse problems or prevent doctors from intervening effec-
MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. (2004), available at http://www.ncsacw.samhsa.
gov/files/SAFERR.pdf.
193. E.g., Kenneth J. Lau et al., MANDATED REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR SOCIAL WORKERS 159–79 (2009) (devoting a chapter to
the “legal and ethical issues in mandated reporting”).
194. See FRONTLINE, Interview: Richard Gelles, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/fostercare/inside/gelles.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2013) (describ-
ing Gelles as a drafter of the Adoption and Safe Families Act and an advocate of
removing more children from families).
195. GELLES, supra note 181, at 153–55.  Other scholars articulate a similar concern.
E.g., Michael S. Wald, Preventing Maltreatment or Promoting Positive Develop-
ment—Where Should a Community Focus Its Resources?, in PREVENTING CHILD
MALTREATMENT, supra note 47, at 182, 192–93; Don Duquette, Looking Ahead: A
Personal Vision of the Future of Child Welfare Law, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 317,
334 (2007).
196. GELLES, supra, note 181, at 154.
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tively.197  As a result, mandatory reporting laws likely induce a reduc-
tion in the frequency of screenings of pregnant women for drug use.198
Even when physicians seek to use screening and referral protocols to
help patients in a respectful and collaborative way, those actions “may
be perceived as punitive measures when they are connected with le-
gally mandated testing, or reporting.”199
Seth Kalichman has identified several public health goals that
mandatory reporting is supposed to achieve; they aim to “restore fam-
ily competence and eliminate maltreatment” and “provide or refer
families for mental health services.”200  But it should be evident that
these goals have not been achieved in practice.  As noted above, the
status quo has not led toward improved family competencies, even
when solvable problems are identified; helpful services are simply not
provided in significant numbers.201  Logically, the connection between
mandatory reporting laws and referrals for services is tenuous be-
cause the professionals subject to those laws could be capable of mak-
ing such referrals without reporting the family to CPS authorities.
Indeed, Kalichman’s suggestion that mandatory reporting exists as a
means to obtain services for families shows, at the very least, that
reporting introduces a middleman.  Rather than make service refer-
rals themselves, professionals rely on CPS agencies to do so.  Even if a
middleman is necessary, Kalichman’s suggestion does not explain why
CPS must be the middleman.  If the goal is service referral, a public
health hotline could do the job as easily as a child protection hotline.
This reliance only triggers the harms of CPS responses to hotline
calls—invasive investigations and the threat of child protection regis-
try listings and child removals—a high price to pay for service refer-
rals.  The reliance also illustrates how mandatory reporting impedes
frontline service providers from making service referrals.
Even more deeply, mandatory reporting statutes impede a public
health approach because they occupy the field of professionals’ re-
sponse to possible child maltreatment.  When calling the hotline is
“society’s primary, and arguably only, means of identifying and re-
sponding to child abuse,”202 mandatory reporting statutes leave the
professionals who could provide a public health response with little
197. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 422, AT-
RISK DRINKING AND ILLICIT DRUG USE: ETHICAL ISSUES IN OBSTETRIC AND GYNECO-
LOGIC PRACTICE 5 (2008), available at http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee
%20Opinions/Committee%20on%20Ethics/co422.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20120531T124
7428368 [hereinafter ACOG OPINION 422].
198. James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States: Continued Consignment
of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 445 (2008).
199. ACOG OPINION 422, supra note 197 at 6.
200. KALICHMAN, supra note 182, at 98–99.
201. Supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text.
202. Hafemeister, supra note 49, at 903.
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space to do so; they either call the hotline and trigger a coercive CPS
intervention, or they decide to not make a call, violating the
mandatory reporting statute.  Efforts to engage other service provid-
ers to work with a family cannot be done without risking that one of
those providers will call the hotline; any service provider’s efforts to
build trust are undermined by that provider’s simultaneous duty to
report suspected maltreatment.203  In extreme cases, a homeless fam-
ily merely asking for help in obtaining housing has triggered child pro-
tection hotline calls.204
Consider the hypothetical described at the top of Part II.  The
school social worker surely has reasonable suspicion that the child’s
mother will abuse her—in part because, as discussed in section II.C,
abuse and neglect statutes broadly define those concepts to include
physical discipline with objects, including actions that may leave a
mark.  Thus, mandatory reporting statutes are triggered.  If the social
worker follows the law and calls the hotline, then her relationship
with the child and family will likely change because she reported
them.205  The parent will feel betrayed by the social worker and per-
haps the school, making it more difficult, if not impossible, for anyone
at the school to suggest actions that the child’s mother can take to
help her daughter, to talk with the mother about the various stressors
in her life, or to help the mother address those stressors.206  If the
social worker wants to disregard the law and try to find appropriate
services for the family, it is not clear who else she can call except for
the child protection agency; no other public hotline exists that can pro-
vide a range of voluntary services for a troubled family.
Reporting suspected child abuse or neglect could also have positive
effects in a reporter’s relationship with a client; it could validate a
child client’s report of abuse by an adult and, of course, help protect
203. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Innovations in Child Maltreatment Prevention:
Resolving the Tension between Effective Assistance and Violations of Privacy, in
PREVENTING CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 47, at 156, 168.
204. Annie Gowen, “Heart-wrenching” Catch-22: Homeless Families Who Turn to City
for Help Find No Rooms, Risk Child Welfare Inquiry, WASH. POST, June 23, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/homeless-families-who-turn-to-dc-for-help-
find-no-room-risk-child-welfare-inquiry/2012/06/23/gJQAv9bJyV_story.html.
205. The school social worker will, in theory, remain anonymous. E.g., CAL. PEN.
CODE § 11167 (d)(1).  But, in practice, it is not difficult to determine who made a
hotline call from the timing of the ensuing investigation and the investigator’s
questions.
206. One immigrant parent articulated this sense of betrayal: “In my country the
teacher is the person with the power and has a right to speak.  The parents re-
spect the teacher to tell them what is going on—here, they [the teachers] talk
behind your back to the government and you the parents are without any power.”
Ilze Earner, Immigrant Families and Public Child Welfare: Barriers to Services
and Approaches for Change, 86 CHILD WELFARE 63, 80 (2007).
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children from future abuse.207  Engaging the coercive power of the law
can, in some cases, help clients admit abuse and work to avoid repeat-
ing past misdeeds.208  But these positive effects do not result from the
law mandating reporting.  Laying responsibility for a report on
mandatory reporting laws does not help clinicians develop stronger
therapeutic relationships.209  Rather, these positive effects require the
use of professional discretion that mandatory reporting laws out-
law.210  For instance, making a CPS report is most likely effective to
treatment when the alleged maltreater was not the child’s parents; in
such cases, parents and children tended to view reports as validating
their concerns and protecting them.211  In contrast, when the client is
the person alleged to have maltreated a child, the likelihood that the
client would leave treatment—thus possibly endangering children—
increases.212
Mandatory reporting statutes have long been animated by the idea
that legally requiring child abuse and neglect reporting is necessary to
ensure that professionals do not turn a blind eye to abuse or neglect;
Ben Mathews and Donald Bross, for instance, argue that mandatory
reporting ensures that authorities identify a higher rate of abuse and
neglect than in jurisdictions without such reporting.213  Such statis-
tics, however, do not establish the marginal effect of mandatory re-
porting.  Jane Walfogel’s comparison of the United States and Britain
(which does not have mandatory reporting) found that this relatively
high level of reports did not lead to better child safety outcomes; if
anything, children suffered less repeat maltreatment in Britain,
which is without mandatory reporting.214 Similarly, Duncan Lindsey
has concluded that years of data establish that increasing reporting
does not lead to fewer child fatalities.215  These results should not be
surprising.  Unlike a half century ago when mandatory reporting stat-
utes were first enacted, professional awareness of the most severe
kinds of maltreatment has significantly increased, and key profes-
sions have institutionalized a focus on maltreatment.  For instance,
children’s hospitals now frequently have child protection centers de-
207. LEVINE, supra note 172, at 119–29; Kalichman, supra note 182, at 99.
208. KALICHMAN, supra note 182, at 99–100.
209. LEVINE, supra note 172, at 104–05.
210. Id. at 142–44 (arguing for discretionary reporting); see also KALICHMAN, supra
note 182, at 102–03 (listing criteria like “gain acceptance for reporting” and “gain
consent for reporting” as part of “therapeutically applying mandatory reporting
laws”—even though such steps are not possible in all cases).
211. LEVINE, supra note 172, at 79.
212. Id.
213. Mathew & Bross, supra note 180, at 512 (comparing substantiated abuse and
neglect rates in England and western Australia with rates in Canada, the United
States, and other Australian jurisdictions).
214. WALDFOGEL, supra note 118, at 64.
215. LINDSEY, supra note 17, at 137–38.
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signed to identify injuries most likely caused by abuse.216  Instead of
protecting children from the most severe forms of abuse, therefore,
mandatory reporting statutes serve to widen the scope of CPS involve-
ment in less serious cases and prevent the use of less coercive inter-
ventions in those cases.
B. Mandatory Investigation Statutes and the Trend Toward
Differential Response
It is not only the existence of mandatory reporting statutes and the
immense number of resulting calls, but also child protection agencies’
legally required response to such calls that undermines a public
health approach.  In most jurisdictions, the school social worker’s call
will automatically trigger a child protection investigation because
most state statutes require child welfare agencies to investigate every
allegation of abuse or neglect.217  These investigations are hallmarks
of a parental-fault paradigm—coercive actions that seek to determine
if a parent has committed a particular bad act.  As discussed above,
these investigations impose harms in their own right, invading chil-
dren’s and parents’ privacy, causing anxiety and other emotional
harms on children, and limiting families’ economic security and oppor-
tunities by placing parents on child protection registries.  In communi-
ties in which child protection agencies have particularly large
impacts, child protection investigations may become weapons in per-
sonal conflicts, as neighbors may trigger investigations by alleging
child maltreatment.218  Beyond the invasiveness of the resulting in-
vestigations, this phenomenon can increase tensions among neigh-
bors,219 which may weaken the communal bonds that could provide a
crucial form of private support for many families.  They may contrib-
ute to a generalized weakening of parental authority over their chil-
dren;220 when a stranger comes to a home, inspects every room
against a parent’s wishes, asks the parents personal questions, and
insists on interviewing children alone, it teaches children that their
216. E.g., Children’s Nat’l Medical Center, CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PROTECTION
CENTER, http://www.childrensnational.org/departmentsandprograms/default.
aspx?Id=371&Type=Dept&Name=Child%20and%20Adolescent%20Protection
%20Center (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).
217. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.301(a) (West 2008) (“[T]he [child welfare] de-
partment or designated agency shall make a prompt and thorough investigation
of a report of child abuse or neglect . . . .”).
218. Roberts, supra note 28, at 138–41.  Jane Waldfogel found a large “extent to which
the system seems to be used for family and other quarrels” without much evi-
dence of maltreatment. WALDFOGEL, supra note 118, at 19.
219. Roberts, supra note 28, at 138–41.
220. Ruth Lawrence-Karski, United States: California’s Reporting System, in COMBAT-
ING CHILD ABUSE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND TRENDS 31–32 (Neil Gilbert
ed., 1997) (quoting Albert J. Solnit, Children, Parents and the State, 52 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 496, 501–02 (1982)).
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parents’ authority is far from absolute.  Coupled with the anxiety pro-
duced by such invasions,221 we should expect that CPS investigations
will often trigger discipline problems among many affected children.
Child welfare law has gradually begun to acknowledge these
harms, as at least eighteen states have implemented “alternative re-
sponse” or differential response programs.222  As the name suggests,
these programs direct child welfare authorities to respond to different
types of child abuse and neglect reports differently.  A report that an
infant has suffered injuries that a physician believes were likely
caused by abuse rather than an accident will be investigated, while a
report from the school social worker would trigger an assessment of
the family’s needs and an offer of services.  Differential response be-
gins with a legal change; in place of mandatory investigation laws,
legislatures give child protection agencies the choice of how to respond
to abuse or neglect reports—with a traditional investigation or a fam-
ily assessment.223
This legal reform is striking for stepping away from a parental-
fault model and toward a public health model.  No investigation oc-
curs, so there is no designation of a parent who is at fault and no
placement of a parent on the child protection registry.  They are de-
signed to focus government assessments on a family’s full range of
needs rather than determining whether a particular incident occurred
as alleged and whether it rises to the level of abuse or neglect.  Family
assessments and subsequent services are voluntary and less stigma-
tizing than a finding of abuse or neglect.  Unsurprisingly, the result is
that families are more likely to participate in services, develop
stronger relationships with social workers, and believe that child wel-
fare agencies treated them fairly.224  The government is also able to
provide services to families faster225—perhaps because the families
are more cooperative or perhaps because the government does not first
take time to document parental fault before arranging for services.  As
a result, the less invasive approach of differential response appears to
help children remain safer than a more invasive investigation.  Sev-
eral states implementing differential response showed better child
221. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 100, at 97.
222. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra note 45, at 18.
223. E.g,. Families Together Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Law 18-228, amending
D.C. CODE § 4-1301.04, available at http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20
100624152836.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2013).  In full disclosure, I advocated for
this bill’s passage and contributed to its drafting.
224. DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE, supra note 14, at 12–13 (collecting research).
225. In Missouri, for instance, assessment track families received services in an aver-
age of seventeen days while investigation track families did so within thirty-five
days. Gary L. Siegel & L. Anthony Loman, The Missouri Family Assessment and
Response Demonstration Impact Evaluation: Digest of Findings and Conclusions,
INST. OF APPLIED RES. 16 (2000), http://www.iarstl.org/papers/MoFamAssess.pdf.
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safety outcomes than with investigations,226 and the worst outcomes
in studies show that differential response has not reduced child safety
outcomes at all.227
One should not conclude, however, that differential response fully
addresses the need for a public health approach to child welfare.
First, the approach is still in its infancy.  The most recent federal data
shows only eighteen states implementing it, accounting for only 9.8%
of responses to child protection calls across the country.228  Moreover,
there is little uniformity in approach; for instance, some states apply
differential response for children of all ages, some still require investi-
gations for all allegations involving young children, some focus differ-
ential response on cases involving domestic violence between adults,
and some explicitly exclude such cases from differential response
programs.229
More fundamentally, differential response may be a less dramatic
change in practice than it promises in the abstract.  In some states,
the same workers perform both investigations and assessments, and,
not surprisingly, many of these workers perform the same actions in
both categories.230  Differential response still filters cases through
child protection agencies—families must first be reported to CPS
agencies, and CPS agencies handle the response.  As a result, entities
like schools remain unlikely to implement a public health approach
and instead would remain likely to simply call in concerns.  CPS agen-
cies’ responses maintain a coercive element that is not necessary in
cases that are largely about providing effective and voluntary ser-
226. DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE, supra note 14, at 9 (“[D]ifferential response systems
have demonstrated positive outcomes, particularly in terms of sustained child
safety . . . .”); Gary L. Siegel & Tony Loman, Extended Follow-Up Study of Minne-
sota’s Family Assessment Response, INST. OF APPLIED RES. 5, 27–30, 42–44 (2006),
http://iarstl.org/papers/FinalMNFARReport.pdf (finding that differential re-
sponse led to reduced recidivism and fewer removals of children from their fami-
lies); L. Anthony Loman & Gary L. Siegel, Differential Response in Missouri After
Five Years, INST. OF APPLIED RES. 2, 8–9 (2004), http://www.iarstl.org/papers/
MODiffResp2004a.pdf (finding improved child safety outcomes through differen-
tial response and fewer repeat CPS hotline reports for families receiving a differ-
ential response than similar families who were investigated); Lisa Merkel-
Holguin et al., National Study on Differential Response in Child Welfare, AM.
HUMANE ASS’N 37 (2006), http://www.americanhumane.org/assets/pdfs/children/
pc-2006-national-study-differential-response.pdf (finding that in Kentucky,
“[c]ases within the investigative track were twice as likely to have a subsequent
investigation with 3 percent [of differential response families] and 5.8 percent of
investigations cases having an investigation within Time #2”).
227. DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE, supra note 14, at 11.
228. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra note 45, at 17.
229. Cynthia Godsoe, Just Intervention: Differential Response in Child Protection, 21
J.L. & POL’Y 73, 79–80 (2012–2013).
230. Waldfogel, supra note 81, at 144.
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vices.231  Even though differential response services are formally vol-
untary, and some data suggests that agencies rarely turn differential
response cases into adversarial investigations or removals,232 implicit
coercion remains.  When a child welfare agency official comes to a
home to say, “We received a hotline call, and we’d like to help,” it is
not hard to imagine many if not most families believing that negative
consequences will flow from a decision to not cooperate.233  A less in-
vasive structure would have a different agency—or perhaps a new
agency staffed by public health nurses—offer services through a dif-
ferential response system.
Minnesota has begun experimenting with a differential response
structure along these lines, creating a Parent Support Outreach Pro-
gram that takes two steps to separate its services from CPS.234  First,
it permits any service providers to refer families directly to the pro-
gram for assistance, and it permits families to refer themselves,
bypassing a call to CPS.235  The program seems to have stumbled
upon this CPS-bypass design; it originally only served those families
subject to a screened-out report and was only broadened to include
direct referrals by service providers and self-referrals when the pilot
program did not receive sufficient referrals.236  Such families eventu-
ally became more than 45% of the program,237 which perhaps demon-
strates a strong demand for such voluntary services.  Second, in some
counties, private nonprofits with state contracts operate the Parent
Support Outreach Program, rather than direct employees of state or
county agencies.238  An evaluation of this program found that the fam-
ilies at issue have multiple serious needs239 and that the voluntary
231. See Douglas J. Besharov with Lisa Laumann, Child Abuse Reporting, 33 SOCIETY
40, 44 (1996) (advocating limiting CPS responses to “situations in which the child
is so endangered that social services must be forced upon unwilling parents” and
not when a case involves a need to “provide[ ] services to families in trouble”).
232. See, e.g., Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Commonwealth of Va., Evaluation of the Differential
Response System, Virginia Department of Soc. Services 12 (2008), http://www.dss.
virginia.gov/files/about/reports/children/cps/all_other/2008/differential response
system_evaluation_annualreport_2008_12-08.pdf (reporting that only 2% of fami-
lies referred to an assessment track were subsequently referred for an investiga-
tion). But see Godsoe, supra note 229, at 90–91.
233. See Godsoe, supra note 229 at 91 (asserting that when parents decline services in
some jurisdictions, “they are switched to the investigation track, sometimes by
agency or other mandates, and sometimes just by the common practice of
caseworkers”).
234. See id. at 88–89.
235. Tony Loman et al., Minnesota Parent Support Outreach Program Evaluation,
INST. OF APPLIED RES. 4, 1 (2009), http://www.iarstl.org/papers/PSOPFinalReport.
pdf [hereinafter Minnesota Evaluation].
236. Id. at 4.
237. Id. at 5.
238. Id. at 11.
239. Id. at 35–38.
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services arranged through the program led to significant improvement
in these needs and reduced future reports to CPS.240  A key feature in
this improvement was likely its separation from CPS agencies.  Refer-
rals that did not involve CPS and program outreach by contracted
workers were more likely to lead to successful engagement with case
managers, especially when families had a prior history with CPS and
thus, perhaps, both a reason to distrust state agencies and reason for
state agencies to suspect high maltreatment risks.241
More study is needed; one should not read too much into the re-
sults of one program, especially when a key element of its design ap-
pears haphazard, and its evaluation lacked a control group.242  But its
positive results should come as no surprise and should spark more
intentional and rigorous experimentation and study of voluntary child
welfare services that avoid and even prevent CPS involvement.  Not
only should future studies include an experimental design, but they
should also evaluate whether more positive results can be obtained by
providing more services, such as the provision of legal services to
families.243
C. Specific Reforms
The above analysis suggests several specific reforms to remove the
barriers to a public health approach.
First, state and federal lawmakers should limit mandatory report-
ing statutes to cases involving severe abuse or neglect.244  Such re-
forms would encompass the more severe cases for which mandatory
reporting statutes were drafted—cases of severe injuries from physi-
cal abuse or sexual abuse.  This step would establish coherent lines
between families that need voluntary services and those that need co-
ercion—at least for the limited purpose of determining whether the
alleged maltreatment occurred.
This approach does create a slippery slope risk, as legislators
would face strong pressures to expand them to demonstrate that they
are doing something in response to some future scandal or well-publi-
cized tragedy.  Indeed, that is precisely what happened in the 1970s,
as growing awareness of child abuse and neglect pushed legislators to
240. Id. at xii, 67, 72, 89–90.
241. Id. at 14, 27.  Contracted workers also referred families for more services than
public employees did. Id. at 46.
242. Id. at 67.
243. See infra note 321 and accompanying text.
244. Some mandatory reporting statute is required for states to receive federal child
welfare funding.  42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(i) (Supp. V 2011).  Federal law does not,
however, specify which abuse or neglect must be reported, the level of suspicion
that must exist before reporting is required, or who must be deemed a mandatory
reporter. Id.  Thus, significant room for state innovation exists even without fed-
eral changes.
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expand the scope of mandatory reporting statutes well beyond doc-
tors.245  That slippery slope risk would counsel in favor of a more com-
plete repeal of mandatory reporting statutes.
More modest reforms are possible, as well, and would be consistent
with a public health approach.  For instance, legislatures could permit
mandatory reporters to fulfill their obligation by consulting with CPS
authorities about the need for an investigation based on the facts of
individual cases, without divulging identifying details.246  Alterna-
tively, legislatures could require professionals to report concerns that
a child is being abused or neglected but could provide those profession-
als with discretion regarding to whom they make a report.  A school
social worker addressing a child in a situation described above could
then call either CPS or a voluntary program like the Parent Support
Outreach Program piloted in Minnesota, thus ensuring some atten-
tion is paid to the family without immediately imposing a coercive and
adversarial state response to such concerns.
Even with dramatically narrowed mandatory reporting statutes,
we should expect large numbers of voluntary reports of child abuse
and neglect to continue.  None of these proposals would impede volun-
tary reports to child protection authorities; just as many individuals
who are not mandatory reporters currently report suspected abuse or
neglect to CPS, current mandatory reporters would (and should) also
report many cases even if not legally required.
The second crucial reform is for states247 to limit child protection
investigations to those reports alleging relatively severe abuse or neg-
lect; less severe cases should trigger an offer to assess the family’s
need for services and arrange any indicated services, ideally by an
agency or private organization that is separate from the child protec-
tion agency.  Relatedly, courts should impose warrant and probable
cause limitations on these investigations; these investigations are in-
herently invasive, and nonconsensual searches and seizures should
only occur when the available evidence establishes probable cause of
abuse or neglect and when the government’s action satisfies the mod-
est judicial check of a warrant procedure.248
Third, when CPS agencies substantiate allegations of abuse or neg-
lect against a parent, they should place those parents on child protec-
tion registries only when that step serves the purpose of such
registries—to protect other children from abuse or neglect, especially
245. Hafemeister, supra note 49, at 841–53.
246. Coleman, supra note 203, at 169.
247. Existing federal law encourages states to develop differential response systems
and does not impose significant limits on how states can structure such pro-
grams.  42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a)(4), (a)(6), (a)(9), (a)(10), (a)(13), (a)(14), (b)(2)(B)(v)
(Supp. V 2011).
248. Coleman, supra note 82, at 415–17; Gupta-Kagan, supra note 82, at 421–22.
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from adults with certain jobs, such as teaching or bus driving.  The
most severe forms of abuse should lead to automatic registry place-
ments; to take an easy case, child sex abusers should not be permitted
to work in close proximity to children.  But parents found to have com-
mitted less severe forms of maltreatment should not be placed on re-
gistries without some indication that they pose a risk to other
children.  Most parents should also have the opportunity to petition to
be removed from registries after the passage of time or evidence of
rehabilitation.  Only a small minority of states has taken such steps,
creating registry tiers based on the severity of the abuse or neglect
that they substantiate.249  Those efforts would be made easier in prac-
tice if legal reforms led to more precise definitions of abuse and neg-
lect.250  Alternatively, CPS agencies could perform risk assessments,
hopefully developed to be statistically valid,251 to determine which
parents present a truly unacceptable risk to children such that they
should be barred from employment with children.
IV. ESTABLISHING NARROWER DEFINITIONS OF ABUSE
AND NEGLECT AND MORE CONSISTENT STANDARDS FOR
THE MOST INVASIVE ACTIONS
Existing definitions of child abuse and neglect are overly broad, as
critics have argued for more than three decades; Michael Wald criti-
cized the then-relatively new child abuse and neglect laws in 1975 for
their over breadth and proposed limiting them to more “realistic stan-
dards.”252  Wald later served as a reporter of an American Bar Associ-
ation effort to define child abuse and neglect definitions, which
proposed relatively narrow grounds for court intervention.  The ABA
would have limited jurisdiction to cases involving an existing or “sub-
stantial risk” of a “serious physical injury,” “serious emotional dam-
age” without treatment, sexual abuse, medical neglect risking
“substantial impairment of bodily functions,” or parental encourage-
ment of a child’s delinquent activity.253  Present law remains remark-
ably broad, especially in comparison to the ABA’s proposal.  One state,
for instance, defines abuse to include action causing “any physical in-
jury”254 and permits state intervention whenever a child is “without
249. 16 DEL. CODE ANN. § 923 (2003); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/7.14 (West 2005).
In the majority of states, no such tiers exist. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, supra note 86.
250. Infra Part IV.
251. For a discussion of risk assessments in child welfare, see infra notes 268–273 and
accompanying text.
252. Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 985 (1975).
253. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT: STANDARDS
RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT 16–17 (1981).
254. MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.110(1) (West 2010).
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proper care, custody or support.”255  Defining neglect remains ex-
tremely hard.256
A full accounting of the breadth of state laws and practices to de-
fine “abuse” and “neglect” has been covered before257 and is beyond
the scope of this Article.  This Article instead focuses on the effects of
this breadth and vagueness, which contribute to existing law’s inhibi-
tion of a public health approach.
Operating in tandem with mandatory reporting and mandatory in-
vestigation statutes discussed in Part II, these vague definitions ex-
pand the scope of a number of coercive and invasive elements of our
child welfare system.  They trigger more people to make reports of
suspected child abuse or neglect; mandatory reporter statutes are trig-
gered whenever a reporter has reasonable suspicion of abuse or neg-
lect,258 quite a low bar.259  By triggering more reports, these broad
definitions trigger more CPS investigations, which trigger considera-
tion of the most invasive option available—a court action and
removal.260
Broad and vague definitions also permit remarkable inconsistency
in child protection practice.  Leading studies show only a “weak rela-
tionship” between the severity of abuse and the likelihood that author-
ities removed a child from an abusive family.261  This conclusion is
true even for sexual abuse cases, some of the most serious cases that
the child protection system handles.262
The effect of the vague definitions is exacerbated by the wide dis-
cretion granted to courts to impose dispositions deemed to be in a
child’s best interest.  Finding any kind of child abuse or neglect places
children and parents under a family court’s jurisdiction, and the court
then can adopt whatever disposition the court finds to be in the child’s
best interest.263  This decision is often based on child welfare agency
255. MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.031.1(b) (West 2010); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-
1-103, 19-3-102 (2013) (defining neglect as the absence of “proper parental care”);
D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (2001) (defining a neglected child as “without
proper parental care or control”).
256. E.g., Garbarino, supra note 158, at 59.
257. Wald, supra, note 78.  For a more recent example, see Godsoe, supra note 19, at
123–24.
258. E.g. MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.115.1 (West 2010) (“reasonable cause”).
259. As important, definitions of abuse or neglect are understood in the nonlegal liter-
ature to be “broad” and “ambiguous,” ensuring a large number of reports as a
result.  Levine, supra note 172, at 15, 139.
260. Hafemeister, supra note 49, at 845.
261. LINDSEY, supra note 17, at 146.
262. Id.
263. E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.181.1 (West 2010) (once it finds abuse or neglect, a
court may enter any listed disposition); D.C. CODE § 16-2320(a) (2001) (noting
that once a court finds abuse or neglect it can order “disposition[ ] which will be in
the best interest of the child”). But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1660(B), (E) (1976)
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reports not tested through the rules of evidence and an adversarial
trial.264  As a result, relatively minor cases can lead to foster care
placement while more severe cases can lead to children remaining at
home.  Criminal law provides an illustrative comparison; it separates
criminal conduct into multiple tiers depending on their severity—felo-
nies, subdivided into class A, B, C, and so on, and misdemeanors—and
sentencing guidelines provide a relatively narrow range of sentencing
options in most cases.  With narrow exceptions,265 child welfare law
places all conduct into one category, with a full range of dispositional
options available in all cases.
The dominant parental fault model frames debates over child
abuse and neglect definitions and dispositions as conflicts between
narrowing the definition to “preserve parental rights and family pri-
vacy” and broadening it to “maximize state interventions to protect at-
risk children.”266  A public health approach would address these is-
sues differently, by asking what standards can help focus coercive gov-
ernmental responses where they are most effective and necessary and
leave space for less invasive and more effective interventions in other
cases.  The problem with broad definitions is not only that they permit
too many invasions of family integrity, but that they also lead state
authorities to direct their attention to too many cases, causing more
serious cases to slip through the cracks.267
A public health approach would also seek to identify widely ac-
cepted definitions of child abuse and neglect as a tool to develop statis-
tically valid data regarding child maltreatment and thus make the
most informed policy choices.  The absence of reasonably consistent
practice denies researchers and policy-makers a shared understand-
ing of what child abuse and neglect is; indeed, society likely lacks a
shared understanding of what parental conduct is so bad that it
should be outlawed.  Yet such a baseline is essential to developing key
(requiring the court to find that the child has been abused or neglected “and that
retention of the child in or return of the child to the home would place the child at
unreasonable risk of harm . . . and the child cannot reasonably be protected from
this harm without being removed”).
264. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2319 (2001) (directing the child welfare agency to file a de-
tailed disposition report to the court after it has adjudicated a petition).
265. First, federal law exempts child welfare agencies from requirements to work to
reunify families when “aggravated circumstances” exist, such as murder or vol-
untary manslaughter of another child.  42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(2006).  Second,
a small number of states create tiers for their child abuse and neglect registries.
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
266. Hafemeister, supra note 49, at 845.
267. Richard Gelles, for instance, has called for narrowed definitions of abuse or neg-
lect so that state authorities can better focus their activities. GELLES, supra note
181, at 155–57. See also supra note 81 and accompanying text (finding more ef-
fective sexual abuse investigations when investigators focused on a narrower
range of cases).
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epidemiological tools; it is impossible to create valid actuarial models
that predict risk of future abuse or neglect, for instance, without a
clear understanding of what constitutes abuse or neglect.268  This is a
particularly large problem in child protection, in which existing law
has led to absurdly large variations in the number of children deemed
abused or neglected by different states’ child protection agencies.  At
the low end, Pennsylvania authorities deemed only 1.2 per 1000 chil-
dren in that state to have been abused or neglected, while at the high
end, New York authorities deemed 16.9 per 1000 children to have
been abused or neglected.269  New York parents are not fourteen
times more abusive and neglectful than Pennsylvania parents; rather,
the statistics reflect different understandings of “abuse” and “neglect”
in different state agencies.270  Absent a uniform or standardized un-
derstanding of what constitutes abuse or neglect, applied relatively
consistently across jurisdictions,271 authorities develop risk assess-
ments tied to the likelihood of CPS involvement in that particular
state.272  Resulting assessments are thus designed to reproduce ex-
isting practice rather than to predict more accurately the risks that a
child will face.  To shape improved practice would require clearer defi-
nitions of abuse or neglect, which would provide clearer norms for the
next generation of risk assessments.  The problem is severe enough
that the Centers for Disease Control felt it necessary to propose uni-
form definitions of abuse and neglect in 2008 so that public health
practitioners could measure child abuse and neglect more accurately
and identify those groups who could most benefit from targeted
interventions.273
States274 should define abuse and neglect more narrowly.  Nar-
rower definitions should limit court cases and their inherent coercion
to those that are more serious, in which a child has suffered or faces
268. See Marsha Garrison, Taking the Risks out of Child Protection Risk Analysis, 21
J.L. & POL’Y 5, 25 (2012) (criticizing child protection risk assessments for failing
to use “standardized definitions of abuse and neglect”).
269. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra note 45, at 32.  This Article excludes the Dis-
trict of Columbia’s even higher ratio—22.6 per 1000—because the unique bound-
aries of that city-“state” make for difficult comparisons.
270. No correlation exists between states’ risk factors for child maltreatment and the
rates at which state child protection authorities find child maltreatment to exist.
Wald, supra note 78.
271. Many variables besides the legal definitions themselves can affect different prac-
tices, including high-profile child fatalities and changes in agency leadership.
Because this Article focuses on a public health legal structure, this Article focuses
on the legal definitions.
272. Garrison, supra note 268, at 27.
273. CHILD MALTREATMENT SURVEILLANCE: UNIFORM DEFINITIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
AND RECOMMENDED DATA ELEMENTS 3, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION  (2008), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/cm_surveillance-a.pdf.
274. This Article uses the word “states” because Congress has declined to establish
federal definitions of child abuse and neglect through federal funding statutes.
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too great of a risk of suffering a serious physical injury, a serious emo-
tional harm, or some other significant obstacle to proper development
caused by blameworthy parental conduct.  With more precise defini-
tions, researchers should study which dispositions are most effective
for which cases, and the law—through legislation, agency regulation,
and case law—should direct appropriate dispositions accordingly.
V. LEGAL REFORMS TO PROVIDE FAMILIES SERVICES
REGARDLESS OF CPF FINDING PARENTAL FAULT
A public health approach would limit the use of coercive legal in-
tervention.  Investigating a family and labeling a parent “unfit,” with
all the harms and stigma that entails, should be reserved for severe
cases or when less coercive steps have failed.  When children or par-
ents need services, and seek out or would voluntarily participate in
such services, then the law should not require the use of a CPS mid-
dleman, which would delay the provision of services and unnecessarily
investigate and potentially label the family.275  There is especially no
need for the state to take custody of a child as a means of providing
services.  Legal reforms are necessary to put these public health prin-
ciples into practice.
An extreme example involves the use of foster care not to protect
children from unfit parents but to qualify children for mental health
services.  Thousands of cases involve children who are placed in foster
care in order to qualify them for mental health services that parents
cannot obtain on their own.276  Some states define neglect to include
situations when a child needs mental health care “and the par-
ent . . . is unable to afford or access appropriate mental health treat-
ment or care for the child.”277  These cases represent an extreme
failure to follow a public health approach: the state weakens children’s
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (Supp. V 2011) (disclaiming any federal defi-
nition of abuse or neglect).
275. Supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
276. Weithorn, supra note 112, at 1375–76.
277. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.031.1(1)(d) (West 2010). See also, e.g., In re W.L.H., 739
S.E.2d 322, 326 (Ga. 2013) (Hunstein, C.J., dissenting) (reciting the trial court’s
finding “that the child was deprived on the ground that his guardians’ lack of
financial resources made them incapable of securing the residential treatment he
needed”).  The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law has asserted that “at least
half of the states” force parents to “choose between getting the mental health
treatment their child needs and retaining legal custody of the child” and esti-
mates the number of affected families in the thousands.  Mary Giliberti & Rhoda
Schulzinger, Relinquishing Custody: The Tragic Result of Failure to Meet Chil-
dren’s Mental Health Needs Executive Summary, THE BAZELON CENTER FOR
MENTAL HEALTH LAW 1 (2000),  http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?file-
ticket=-hWbIbUX5v8%3d&tabid=104.  For a parent’s first-hand account of one
such case, see TONI HOY, SECOND TIME FOSTER CHILD: ONE FAMILY’S FIGHT FOR
THEIR SON’S MENTAL HEALTHCARE AND PRESERVATION OF THEIR FAMILY (2012).
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legal bonds with their parents when a parent has done nothing wrong
and when the coercive legal step is unnecessary for their protection.
These states place foster care on the table only because of the state’s
failure to offer a continuum of services that all parents can afford.
Neglect definitions should be reformed to preclude using foster care to
remedy that failure.
Law reform must focus on building a children’s mental health sys-
tem that can provide adequate services without families ever turning
to foster care to obtain voluntary mental health services.278  Medicaid
and other health care funding streams may provide some paths to en-
suring adequate funding for effective interventions at all stages of a
continuum, something that is essential to providing adequate funding
to meeting the full range of needs.279  If families could obtain neces-
sary mental health care for children without surrendering custody of
their children, then there would be little use of foster care as a means
of obtaining mental health care.
More broadly, the present child welfare system too often conditions
services to families on CPS agencies completing investigations and
substantiating abuse or neglect.  A parental-fault paradigm supports
such a condition because that paradigm seeks to know whether a par-
ent has committed a bad act before determining how to respond.  But
it is not justified on empirical data about risk to children, which shows
that substantiating one allegation of maltreatment bears little statis-
tical relationship to future risk to the child.280  For the millions of
families of children at high risk for poor life outcomes, the law should
separate the provision of services from some finding of parental
fault.281  Unfortunately, that is not the reality; CPS agencies are more
than twice as likely to provide services to families following substanti-
ated investigations, and some states even refuse to offer services un-
less they substantiate an allegation of abuse or neglect.282  To reform
the practice, states should, whenever possible, separate the provision
of services from an investigation.  This goal is best accomplished
through differential response programs, discussed in section II.B
278. The problems include the school system, public and private health insurers, and
the general shortage of community mental health services.  Weithorn, supra note
112, at 1376.
279. WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 113, at 185.  Mental health advocates have explained
how major federal funding streams like Medicaid can help ensure access to
mental health services without using foster care. Avoiding Cruel Choices: A
Guide for Policymakers and Family Organizations on Medicaid’s Role in Prevent-
ing Custody Relinquishment, THE BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW
(2002), http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=-g7QVr0wWF8%3d&
tabid=104.
280. Kohl et al., supra note 122.
281. See id. at 23 (“Services decisions should be decoupled from the idea of
substantiation.”).
282. Kohl et al., supra note 122, at 18.
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above; among other benefits, differential response leads to faster pro-
vision of services, in part because families do not have to wait for CPS
to complete an investigation.283  It is particularly well-accomplished
through innovations like the Parent Support Outreach Program—pro-
grams which operate separately from CPS agencies and to which other
professionals may refer families in place of a CPS referral.284  For
cases that remain assigned to CPS agencies for investigation, the law
should require CPS agencies to offer services to families regardless of
whether the agencies substantiate maltreatment allegations and to
assess service needs and provide services during the course of an in-
vestigation unless doing so would jeopardize the investigation.
The federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act codifies
one element of this practice, requiring child welfare agencies to refer
any child under three “who is involved in a substantiated case of child
abuse or neglect”285 to early childhood special education programs.
Under this law, to trigger the referral, one would need a CPS report,
an investigation, and substantiation.  Children are thus excluded from
this referral mandate if they are (a) not reported, (b) placed on a dif-
ferential response track, or (c) subject to allegations that are investi-
gated but not substantiated.  From a public health perspective, a
young child who is the subject of a child abuse and neglect referral is
likely to benefit from a developmental screening and any necessary
services—and thus a referral to early childhood special education.
There is no principled reason to limit such referrals to substantiated
cases.  The law should require CPS agencies and other public agencies
in contact with young children to make such early intervention refer-
rals directly without conditioning them on substantiation.
VI. REFORMING FEDERAL CHILD WELFARE FUNDING TO
SUPPORT A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH
Although funding streams shape the institutions that provide in-
terventions to increase health, public health “researchers have not
properly studied funding laws.”286  This section focuses on federal
funding streams because foster care services and most services pro-
vided to families to prevent maltreatment receive a significant
amount of funding from the federal government.287  Moreover, federal
283. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 234–42 and accompanying text.
285. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xxi) (Supp. V 2011) (emphasis added).
286. Susan Vivian Mangold et al., Using Community-Based Participatory Research to
Study the Relationship Between Sources and Types of Funding and Mental
Health Outcomes for Children Served by the Child Welfare System in Ohio, 21
J.L. & POL’Y 113, 125 (2012).
287. State and local funding streams can also shape outcomes.  Susan Mangold and
Catherine Cerulli found a correlation between a dedicated child welfare property
tax levy in some Ohio counties and higher adoption rates and lower foster care
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funding is so significant that it shapes state and local child welfare
policies—and plays an “often determinative” role in such policies.288
Federal child welfare funding is particularly complicated because
many states use multiple federal funding streams to support state and
local child welfare agencies289 and because states vary in the propor-
tion of federal, state, and local funds used for child welfare agen-
cies.290  This section will focus on Title IV-E of the Social Security Act,
which governs federal funding for state agencies serving children in
foster care.
A central element of a public health approach is that society should
make available a spectrum of interventions and choose the most effec-
tive intervention for a particular family.291  Federal funding schemes
should support all elements along that spectrum equally and should
not create financial incentives to choose one option along that spec-
trum.  Individual decisions of which interventions to choose should de-
pend on their likely effectiveness, and policy decisions regarding
which interventions to invest in—and thus make available for individ-
ual cases—should depend on their effectiveness and the need of the
population.  Neither set of decisions should depend on funding availa-
bility.  Moreover, if a public health approach endorses particularly in-
vasive alternatives only when necessary,292 then any differential in
federal funding should disfavor the most invasive interventions.
Present federal funding works in the opposite manner: state child
welfare agencies receive Title IV-E funds as entitlement payments for
all eligible foster children.  Federal law places no cap on either the
number of children for whom state agencies can claim Title IV-E funds
or the amount of funds states can claim for particular children—at
least for children whom state agencies have removed from their homes
and placed in foster care.  Conversely, funds for services to prevent the
need for foster care through Title IV-B of the Social Security Act are
fixed and about ten times lower than the total amount of Title IV-E
populations.  Susan Vivian Mangold & Catherine Cerulli, Follow the Money: Fed-
eral, State, and Local Funding Strategies for Child Welfare Services and the Im-
pact of Local Levies on Adoptions in Ohio, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 349, 374-82 (2009);
see also Mangold et al., supra note 286, at 125 (finding “a positive correlation
between flexible local funding and outcomes that lead to improved mental health
for children in foster care”).
288. Mangold & Cerulli, supra note 287, at 351; see also Vivek Sankaran, Innovation
Held Hostage: Has Federal Intervention Stifled Efforts to Reform the Child Wel-
fare System?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 287 (2007–2008) (describing child
welfare policy as “driven by federal law”).
289. In addition to Title IV-E funds discussed above, states can use Social Security
Block Grants and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families block grant funds to
support child welfare activities.
290. Mangold & Cerulli, supra note 287, at 352–53.
291. See supra notes 156–62 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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funds provided.293  Moreover, when budget cuts from the so-called “se-
quester” took effect in 2013, Title IV-E foster care payments were ex-
empted from cuts while prevention services faced cuts.294  States
replicated this budget-cutting pattern as they cut their budgets during
the great recession and its aftermath, and they focused cuts on child-
abuse and neglect prevention programs rather than the foster care
programs that receive more federal funding and have more federal
mandates.295
Federal incentive payments are available to states that increase
the number of children adopted into new families out of foster care,296
but no such incentives exist for keeping children safely at home.  A
state agency will thus receive relatively little federal financial support
to work to keep a child with his family, but it will receive federal reim-
bursement of 50–83% of all eligible costs if it removes that child from
his family.297  This funding structure may contribute to disparity in
specialized services.  Although children in and out of foster care need
such services, those in foster care, for whom CPS agencies may claim
federal support, are more likely to receive specialized services.298  At
the very least, the absence of significant sustained funding for preven-
tion services creates a “very challenging context for mounting a pro-
gram of evidence-based parent-mediated interventions.”299
This harm is compounded by a further quirk of federal funding
law: to obtain federal funding for foster care services to a particular
child, a child welfare agency must document not only that the child
was abused or maltreated, but also that the child is poor enough to
293. Sankaran, supra note 288, at 300; Mangold & Cerulli, supra note 287, at 363,
370.
294. Lisa Pilnik, Advocates See Impacts from Sequester, Brace for More, YOUTH TODAY
(Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.youthtoday.org/view_article.cfm?article_id=6002.
295. Illinois illustrates the point: a $50 million reduction in the Department of Chil-
dren and Family Services was focused on prevention programs, and more than
275 of 375 layoffs were of staff who worked with families to avoid the need for
foster care.  Bill Ruthhart, DCFS Cuts May Force More Kids into Foster Care:
Intact Family Services Slashed as Agency Lays off Staff, Tightens Eligibility
Rules, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 4, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-04/
news/ct-met-dcfs-intact-families-20120904_1_dcfs-cuts-dcfs-investigator-dcfs-di-
rector-richard-calica; Doug Finke, Department of Children and Family Services
Mulls Cuts, Layoffs, ST. J.-REG. (June 20, 2012), http://www.sj-r.com/top-stories/
x1884284408/Illinois-DCFS-mulls-cuts-layoffs.
296. 42 U.S.C. § 673b (2006).
297. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 674(a)(1) (2006) (setting the federal reimbursement rate for “fos-
ter care maintenance” costs as the same as the federal Medicaid reimbursement
rate); § 1396d(b) (Supp. V 2011) (setting a minimum and maximum Medicaid re-
imbursement rate of 50% and 83%, respectively).  A state agency that reunifies a
foster child with her family will lose its Title IV-E funding for that child’s case
and rely more significantly on its own funding for services and case management
for the reunified child.  Sankaran, supra note 288, at 300–01.
298. WULCZYN et al., supra note 113, at 86.
299. WULCZYN et al., supra note 113, at 163.
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have been eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children.300
Tying eligibility to that program is at best anachronistic (it was trans-
formed to Temporary Aid to Needy Families in the 1996 welfare re-
form) and at worst imposes administrative burdens on child welfare
agencies and focuses case workers on families’ poverty rather than
their needs.301  Most importantly for this Article’s argument, it illus-
trates the lack of coherent rationale behind the present funding re-
gime and thus the value of reform.
The federal government should expand and make permanent the
ability of states to seek waivers from requirements regarding how fed-
eral child welfare funds are spent; that authority is currently subject
to an expiration date and a limit on the number of states that can
obtain a waiver.302  Such waivers provide states an annual lump sum
of federal funding;303 in exchange for foregoing Title IV-E’s uncapped
entitlement to federal funding if the number of foster children in-
creases, states receive the flexibility to use federal funding as they see
fit—including reducing the number of children removed.  Indeed, past
federal waivers have shown states that sought to do so invested in
services designed to prevent the need for foster care304—thus creating
a broader spectrum of services, consistent with a public health ap-
proach.  Similarly, most states receiving the current federal waivers
appear to be using the flexibility granted to them to invest in preven-
tion services.305  Moreover, developing such services led to greater col-
laboration with other government agencies and community-based
300. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(3)(2006).
301. Susan Vivian Mangold, Poor Enough to be Eligible? Child Abuse, Neglect, and the
Poverty Requirement, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 575 (2007).
302. The statute currently grants the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
authority to issue waivers from Title IV-E requirements to up to ten states.  42
U.S.C. § 1320a-9(a)(2) (Supp. V 2011).  Not only are the number of waivers lim-
ited, but the authority to grant them is time-limited, expiring in 2014, id., and
Congress has previously granted waiver authority only to let it expire. INFORMA-
TION MEMORANDUM: CHILD WELFARE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS FOR FISCAL YEARS
2012-2014, ACYF-CB-IM-12-05, at 2–3, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ADMIN. ON CHILD., YOUTH & FAMILIES (2012), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/cb/im1205.pdf.
303. SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS: TITLE IV-E FLEXIBLE FUNDING: CHILD WELFARE WAIVER
DEMONSTRATIONS, 5, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMIN. FOR
CHILD. & FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILD., YOUTH & FAMILIES (2011), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/flexible.pdf.
304. Id. at ii–iii, 14.
305. JooYeun Chang, Innovation in Child Welfare Continues with 8 New Title IV-E
Wavier Demonstrations, FAM. ROOM BLOG (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.acf.hhs.
gov/blog/2013/09/innovation-in-child-welfare-continues-with-8-new-title-iv-e-
waiver (reporting that five of the eight states receiving waivers in 2013 are in-
creasing investments in services designed to prevent the need for foster care).
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organizations,306 entities that might be more inclined to see options
other than removing children.
Data from past “flexible funding” waivers is inconclusive but sug-
gests that states that use flexible funding to increase the availability
of services can reduce the number of children removed from their fam-
ilies while simultaneously improving child safety outcomes as mea-
sured by repeat instances of child maltreatment.  Florida achieved the
most dramatic results, reducing its foster care population by 38% over
four years while reducing the number of children who experienced
maltreatment within six months of the child welfare agency closing
their cases from 8.2% to 5.2%.307  Of the four states that used flexible
funding to prevent the need for foster care placements (Florida, Indi-
ana, North Carolina, and Ohio), three were able to do so to a statisti-
cally significant degree (Florida, Indiana, and Ohio).  And two of these
states (Florida and Indiana) also succeeded in reducing the incidence
of repeat maltreatment, while the third (Ohio) saw no impact in that
incidence—suggesting that keeping children out of foster care is not
associated with increased safety risks to children.308
VII. BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BEYOND CPS TO
APPLY A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH IN COMMON
FACT PATTERNS
The above reforms alone are necessary but not sufficient to develop
a public health approach.  An essential problem is that institutions
and individuals best suited to lead a public health response to child
maltreatment are not presently structured to do so, lack the legal tools
and mandates to do so,309 and have few options other than calling
child protection authorities to address concerning situations.310  The
solution then is to pursue legal reforms that will build institutions’
and individuals’ ability to implement a public health approach.
This task is immensely complicated because of the wide range of
institutions that are poised to catalyze a public health response.
Those entities include community health centers, pediatricians’ of-
fices, and any number of public and private social service agencies
whose clientele include children or parents, especially those with risk
factors for child maltreatment.  These reforms will necessarily vary
from institution to institution and will depend on the unique body of
306. Id. at 21.
307. Id. at 28–30.
308. Id. at iii, 27.
309. Lois Weithorn also argues adoption of “positive mandates” to provide effective
interventions before we impose negative mandates—prohibitions on certain inva-
sive actions—on institutions.  Weithorn, supra note 112, at 1475–76.
310. Gilbert et al., supra note 48, at 334 (describing the limited options pediatricians
have for referring families for assistance).
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laws that govern different types of institutions—and so a full catalog
of reforms is beyond this Article’s scope.  This section will focus on two
areas to illustrate legal reforms that can help build a public health
approach: the roles of public schools—early childhood programs, ele-
mentary schools, and secondary schools—encountering children who
may have been abused or neglected and the roles of hospitals and
medical personnel encountering pregnant and postpartum women
who abuse substances.
A. Building a School-to-Health Pipeline
This Article use schools as an example for several reasons.  First,
school personnel consistently account for the largest single source of
child maltreatment reports of any group—about 17% of all reports.311
Second, schools are among those best suited to arrange a public health
response because they are familiar with children in their full context,
including their families, peer groups, and communities.312  Schools
see school-age children more than any other institution beyond the
family.  Children are compelled to attend school,313 and the age at
which children may begin to attend school is gradually dropping with
the expansion of public pre-kindergarten programs.314  School days
account for about half of school-aged children’s lives.315 Schools also
see these children’s families at school drop-off and pick-up, for
younger children at least, and when students have problems at school.
Third, schools should have an incentive to understand the various pos-
sible causes of children’s behavioral struggles because behavioral
problems stemming from child maltreatment are important contribu-
tors to academic failure.316  Fourth, schools have historically been and
311. Following the federal government’s categories, “education personnel” and “child
daycare providers” accounted for 17.8%, 17.6%, 17.2%, 17.3%, and 16.7% of all
child maltreatment reports each year, respectively, from 2007 through 2011.
They were followed by legal and law enforcement personnel (about 16% each
year) and social services personnel (10–11% each year)—although some of these
reporters may work at schools, such as school police officers or school social work-
ers. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2011, supra note 45, at 8.
312. Cf. Todres, supra note 144, at 494 (“[T]eachers and other school officials often are
well positioned to identify vulnerable children before they are exploited.”)
313. E.g,. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.031(1).
314. For instance, the District of Columbia has dramatically expanded access to free
public preschool programs for three- and four-year-olds.  Pre-K Enhancement and
Expansion Act of 2008, D.C. CODE tit. III, § 38-272.05 (2008), available at http://
dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20080515162055.pdf.
315. States set the length of school years, most commonly 180 days and no less than
160 out of 365. EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, STATE NOTES: SCHEDULING/LENGTH
OF SCHOOL YEAR (2008), available at http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/78/24/
7824.pdf.
316. See, e.g., Nancy Buchanan, The Effects of Parental Involvement on 12th Grade
Achievement, 4 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 75, 75 (1998) (“It is widely accepted that
both family behaviors and characteristics play a critical role in the academic
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continue to be a locus of public health efforts—immunization require-
ments, vision and hearing tests, health classes317—and can similarly
become essential agents in a public health approach to child welfare.
Despite these factors, schools generally do not consider a public
health approach to the child maltreatment they frequently observe.
Faced with a child experiencing some form of maltreatment and the
behavioral and academic consequences of it, schools typically focus on
a limited range of services for children, impose punishments on chil-
dren when maltreatment leads to bad behavior, or call a child protec-
tion hotline to report possible maltreatment.  The present child
welfare system’s suggestion to schools addressing such situations is
predictable—train school staff to identify and report suspected mal-
treatment.318  While such hotline calls will often be appropriate, a le-
gal structure in which other actions are encouraged would represent a
large amount of progress.
Returning to the hypothetical from Part II, the social worker
should have several options besides calling the child protection hotline
and commonly available school interventions, such as disciplining the
student, assigning the student a tutor, or referring the student for
special education.  To name some steps, the social worker could refer
the child’s mother—who she thought exhibited signs of clinical depres-
sion—to mental health providers.319  She could refer the family to spe-
cific programs proven to help parents address the difficult
behaviors.320  She could ask the mother what she needed to help stabi-
growth and achievement of children . . . .”); BARBARA T. KELLEY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, IN THE WAKE OF CHILDHOOD MAL-
TREATMENT 1 (1997), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/165257.pdf (ex-
plaining that children who experience maltreatment are more likely to have low
academic achievement and various other negative social outcomes).
317. James G. Hodge Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements:
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831 (2002).
318. The federal government’s guide to educators regarding child maltreatment em-
phasizes identification and reporting of maltreatment. THE ROLE OF EDUCATORS
IN PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 8, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES (2003), available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/educator/educator.pdf.  It also
addresses “preventing child abuse and neglect,” id., but the suggestions involving
prevention are all focused on services directed at children, not any directed at
parents or families, thus failing to address children in their context. Id. at 45–53.
319. Maternal depression is a common and treatable condition often cited as a risk
factor for child maltreatment. TRACY VERICKER ET AL., INFANTS OF DEPRESSED
MOTHERS LIVING IN POVERTY: OPPORTUNTIES TO IDENTIFY AND SERVE 1 (2010),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412199-infants-of-depressed.pdf
(linking maternal depression to poor parenting and physical and mental health
problems in children).
320. Various mental health programs have been proven to help parents manage diffi-
cult behaviors of children of various ages. See WULCZYN ET AL., supra note 113, at
156 (listing evidence-based interventions).  Multi-Systemic Therapy (“MST”) ad-
dresses multiple causes of troublesome adolescent behavior, including parental
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lize her home.  Perhaps some public benefits were cut off, perhaps the
mother is facing eviction, or perhaps she needs legal assistance pro-
tecting herself or her children from an abusive partner.321  The social
worker could refer her to public benefits programs or, if needed, to an
employment access.
Several concerns about our present legal structure are apparent in
these answers.  First, the law does not currently require schools to
take steps that focus on the needs of families; interventions generally
focus on the child.  As a result, any school social worker who takes
these steps will likely be an outlier.  Second, the school social worker
may not have the most effective referral sources or know which pro-
grams will be willing to serve this family at low or no cost or, perhaps,
which programs would be compensated through public sources (such
as Medicaid).  Third, it will be difficult for the school social worker to
follow up with the mother or coordinate different services.  It is likely
beyond the social worker’s authority to ask for information regarding
the mother’s progress absent the mother’s consent.
These concerns help outline legal reforms that can help schools ini-
tiate a public health response.  First and foremost, when schools rea-
sonably suspect a child is at risk of maltreatment, the law should
charge schools with helping students and their families obtain ser-
vices to prevent maltreatment and thus empower students to succeed
academically.  Such a charge should not be overly prescriptive, as
schools and school districts need time and flexibility to identify the
best way to meet this charge.  The charge could come through state or
local statutes or regulations; contracts or policies defining school so-
problems.  Weithorn, supra note 112, at 1494–95.  Parent Management Training
has been proven effective at reducing symptoms of children’s conduct disorder.
ALAN E. KAZDIN, PARENT MANAGEMENT TRAINING: TREATMENT FOR OPPOSITIONAL,
AGGRESSIVE, AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (2005);
J.D. Cautilli & T.C. Tillman, Evidence Based Practice in the Home and School to
Help Educate the Socially Maladjusted Child, 1 J. EARLY & INTENSIVE BEHAVIOR
INTERVENTION 27 (2004). Parent–Child Interaction Therapy has been proven ef-
fective in reducing physical abuse, especially of young children.  M. Chaffin et al.,
Parent-Child Interaction Therapy with Physically Abusive Parents: Efficacy for
Reducing Future Abuse Reports, 72 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 500 (2004).
321. One law school clinic helped establish a legal services center for families at risk of
foster care, and the clinic achieved promising results. DETROIT CENTER FOR FAM-
ILY ADVOCACY PILOT EVALUATION REPORT 7/2009–6/2012 (2013), available at
http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/3808685/1466853936/name/Final%20Evaluation.
pdf (2013).  If such results can be established with an experimental design and
replicated, then broadly applying such legal services models would be an essen-
tial piece of a public health approach.  A community schools program in Syracuse,
New York, has also included a legal services component for families of public
school students.  Say Yes to Educ. Syracuse, Free Legal Clinics, http://www.say
yessyracuse.org/family-resources/free-legal-clinics (last visited Aug. 21, 2013);
Sarah D. Sparks, Syracuse ‘Says Yes’ to Whole Child, EDUC. WEEK, Aug. 7, 2013,
at 24–25.
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cial workers’ jobs as identifying services for students and their fami-
lies outside of schools; state or federal (or even private) grant
programs; or some other source.  Schools can begin to address that
charge by offering school-based mental health programs proven to
have some benefit for youth and their families.322  Schools could
devote staff to coordinate services inside and outside of school323 or
expand “community schools” programs that link schools with local
mental health providers to establish school-based clinics that provide
counseling and crisis interventions to students and their families.324
Such efforts appear to have some success—reducing drop-out and
school-suspension rates while improving academic achievement,
school attendance, and high school graduation rates and claiming suc-
cess in reducing abuse and neglect within families.325
That charge can be facilitated through schools and local service
providers sharing information—with the parent’s consent—about de-
velopments in and out of school so comprehensive services can be pro-
vided; where some large urban areas have developed the technological
infrastructure to share information regarding a family in the context
of CPS investigations, they could instead focus on creating the infra-
structure to easily share information—again, with parents’ consent—
between the various entities working with a family.326  Staff—both
322. See Weithorn, supra note 112, at 1360 (collecting studies).
323. See Coleman, supra note 203, at 156, 157 (describing North Carolina schools’
“child and family support teams,” which coordinate services for children, a man-
date which could be expanded to include services for parents in some cases).
324. Scott Bloom, Mental Health Services, in COMMUNITY SCHOOLS IN ACTION: LESSONS
FROM A DECADE OF PRACTICE 98–113 (Joy G. Dryfoos et al. eds., 2005).  Partnering
with community organizations can help prevent overburdening teachers with
new duties—a point community schools’ advocates appear to recognize. See, e.g.,
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS IN ACTION: LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF PRACTICE 187 (Joy
G. Dryfoos et al. eds., 2005) (“Partners such as CAS [Children’s Aid Society] come
into the building and take responsibility for health, social services, extended
hours, and parent and community involvement.”).
325. ICF INTERNATIONAL, COMMUNITIES IN SCHOOLS NATIONAL EVALUATION: FIVE YEAR
SUMMARY REPORT 7–10 (2010), available at http://www.communitiesinschools.
org/about/publications/publication/five-year-national-evaluation-summary-re-
port; MARTIN J. BLANK ET AL., MAKING THE DIFFERENCE: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 40–43 (2003), available at http://www.communityschools.
org/assets/1/Page/CCSFullReport.pdf.  One similar program displays a sharply
declining foster care population as a “result” of its work. See Say Yes to Educ.
Syracuse, Results: Community Engagement, http://www.sayyessyracuse.org/re-
sults (listing 45% decline in county foster care population since 2005 as a pro-
gram “result”).  Proving that the program was a cause of this decline requires
more rigorous study.  But the claim of such causation has intuitive appeal—pro-
viding a range of voluntary services to children and families early should prevent
some maltreatment.
326. California law permits such information sharing when a CPS hotline call is
made. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18961.5 (1992).  Los Angeles County has taken
steps to implement it.  COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICE, INFOR-
MATION SHARING TO PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AND UTILIZATION OF THE COUNTY’S
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the school social workers and staff of other service providers—should
be trained to work effectively across the mental health and educa-
tional systems and other systems with which students and their fami-
lies frequently interact.327
Even with such a charge, school social workers will not be able to
accomplish all goals that they set for a child directly.  It is important
in these cases to create options other than calling CPS, such as refer-
rals to the voluntary services program piloted in Minnesota.328  Relat-
edly, states could create public health hotlines, in which school
officials (and other professionals who are currently mandatory report-
ers) could call service providers better equipped to provide the neces-
sary assistance, and do so without stigmatizing the family,329 or to
which families could self-refer with less fear that asking for help
would lead to CPS taking their children.330  Or, as Lois Weithorn has
suggested, states could create “triage centers,” which could evaluate a
family and arrange for appropriate services provided by various agen-
cies,331 and school social workers could refer families to such centers
for assessment.  Or, as one state adopted as school reform, states could
establish “Family Resource and Youth Service Centers” from which
families could seek assistance or to which schools could refer fami-
lies.332  If, as recommended in Part V, federal child welfare funding
permitted more flexibility, states could use some of these funds to help
establish the services in question.
B. Maternity Wards, Physicians, and Prenatal Drug
Exposure
By any measure, substance abuse during pregnancy, including
both illegal and legal drugs, especially alcohol, is a huge public health
problem.  It significantly increases infant mortality; one study found
FAMILY AND CHILDREN’S INDEX (2009), available at http://file.lacounty.gov/bc/q2_
2009/cms1_133889.pdf.
327. Weithorn, supra note 112, at 1484–87.  Professional organizations have devel-
oped guides to navigate confidentiality laws. E.g., KATHLEEN MCNAUGHT,
MYTHBUSTING, Breaking Down Confidentiality and Decision-Making Barriers to
Meet the Education Needs of Children in Foster Care (2005), available at http://
www.svcf.org/media/articles/files/Mythbusting_Information_Sharing.pdf.
328. Supra notes 235–42 and accompanying text.
329. Coleman, supra note 203, at 167 (describing interventions by health officials as
less stigmatizing and intrusive than those by CPS officials).
330. If, as suggested supra in notes 231–32 and accompanying text, differential re-
sponse systems could be administered by entities separate from child protection
agencies, then those entities could both reduce the coercion inherent in a CPS
agency response and provide appropriate referrals for families.
331. Weithorn, supra note 112, at 1481–83.
332. S. REG’L EDUC. BD., HELPING FAMILIES TO HELP STUDENTS: KENTUCKY’S FAMILY
RESOURCE AND YOUTH SERVICES CENTERS (2001), available at http://publications.
sreb.org/2001/01H01_Helping_Families.pdf.
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that mothers in substance-abuse treatment reported an infant mortal-
ity rate for prior children more than double that of the general popula-
tion.333  Alcohol abuse during pregnancy is the leading cause of
intellectual disabilities and a leading cause of neurological disor-
ders.334  It causes hundreds of millions of dollars in medical costs for
illegal drug-exposed infants and billions of dollars in costs related to
fetal alcohol syndrome.335
Substance-exposed newborns are often referred to child protection
authorities, although the exact number of referrals and how CPS
agencies handle them are hard to pin down precisely.336  Historically,
concern about drug-exposed newborns was a key factor in the sharp
increase in the number of foster children in the 1980s and 1990s,337
and federal funding statutes now require states to make hospitals re-
port drug-exposed infants to child protection authorities as part of
mandatory reporting statutes.338
Treating substance abuse by pregnant women as a per se cause for
coercive child protection intervention is problematic.  Research shows
that the most effective way to help drug-addicted mothers of young
children recover is to keep them together and especially to permit
such mothers to bring their children into inpatient drug treatment.  In
one study, 48% of women who had infants living with them completed
333. H. Westley Clark, Residential Substance Abuse Treatment for Pregnant and Post-
partum Women and Their Children: Treatment and Policy Implications, 80 CHILD
WELFARE 179, 187 (2001).
334. ACOG OPINION 422, supra note 197, at 1.
335. Id.
336. SUBSTANCE-EXPOSED INFANTS: STATE RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM 37, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. (2009)
[hereinafter SUBSTANCE-EXPOSED INFANTS].  This failure to collect basic data and
track the effectiveness of existing interventions is itself a failure to apply basic
lessons of the public health field.  Garrison, supra note 129.  One of the few states
that did track CPS reports regarding substance-exposed infants found only five
out of 1000 births led to such reports.  Mark F. Testa & Brenda Smith, Prevention
and Drug Treatment, 19 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 147, 152 (2009).  Extrapolated
across the nation, in which there are about 4.2 million births annually, http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/births.htm, suggests about 20,000 such reports each
year.  That does not include reports regarding infants whose parents are sus-
pected of a substance-abuse problem that is not discovered until later.  James
Dwyer has also concluded that hospital staffs report only a small portion of sub-
stance-exposed infants to child protection authorities.  Dwyer, supra note 198, at
445, 448.
337. Removals of children born to substance-abusing mothers formed a hugely dispro-
portionate amount of the increasing foster care population in those years; remov-
als of infants increased 89% in New York and 58% in Illinois over three years,
and most of those removals occurred “within days following birth.”  Eugene M.
Lewit, Children in Foster Care, 3 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 192, 196–98 (1993), avail-
able at http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/03_03_In-
dicators.pdf.
338. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
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treatment, compared to 17% of women who did not have their children
with them.339  Limited availability of services should not force
mothers to choose between entering treatment and maintaining cus-
tody of their children.  Moreover, the risks to children from prenatal
drug exposure are often overstated.  Prenatal drug exposure can in-
crease the risk of premature labor and related problems at birth, and
longitudinal studies reveal that it is linked to some behavioral
problems, but little evidence exists that the prenatal drug exposure by
itself causes children severe and lasting harm.  Cocaine exposure in
utero, for instance, shows no significant effects on children’s physical
growth, developmental test scores, or language outcomes.340  Alcohol
exposure in utero may be more dangerous than illegal drug expo-
sure.341  Rather, the environmental factors of being raised by a parent
battling a serious addiction can pose much greater threats, and paren-
tal substance abuse is a significant risk factor for abuse or neglect.342
Conversely, effective interventions to provide more positive home en-
vironments lead to more positive outcomes for substance-exposed in-
fants.343  Unfortunately, existing law either treats in utero drug
exposure as per se neglect344 or seeks to distinguish babies born with
withdrawal symptoms from babies exposed to drugs in utero but with-
339. Clark, supra note 333, at 189. See also id. (“It appears that many of the mothers
who were separated from their young children were unable to concentrate fully
on their own recovery and left treatment prematurely.”).  Similarly, Brenda D.
Smith and Mark F. Testa have concluded that “[d]elaying reunification . . . may
also exacerbate, in unintended ways, substance abuse and other problems related
to future births.”  Brenda D. Smith & Mark F. Testa, The Risk of Subsequent
Maltreatment Allegations in Families with Substance-Exposed Infants, 26 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 97, 110 (2002).
340. John P. Ackerman et al., A Review of the Effects of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure
Among School-Aged Children, 125 PEDIATRICS 554 (2010), available at http://pedi-
atrics.aappublications.org/content/128/3/593.2.full.pdf.html. See also Susan Okie,
Encouraging News on Babies Born to Cocaine-Abusing Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
7, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/world/americas/27iht-
coca.3.19716510.html (summarizing recent research on the harm of in utero co-
caine exposure and the comparative harms of in utero alcohol and tobacco
exposure).
341. Supra note 334 and accompanying text.
342. E.g., Richard P. Barth, Preventing Child Abuse and Neglect with Parent Train-
ing: Evidence and Opportunities, 19 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 95, 96 (2009) (list-
ing parental substance abuse as a core risk factor of abuse or neglect and stating
that it “is commonly considered to be responsible for a substantial proportion of
child maltreatment reported to the child welfare services”); Christine E. Grella et
al., Mothers in Substance Abuse Treatment: Differences in Characteristics Based
on Involvement with Child Welfare Services, 30 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 55, 56
(2006).  One study found that parents with a substance-abuse disorder were three
times more likely to abuse or neglect their children than those without such a
disorder, though the rate was still small—3% in the former group and 1% in the
latter.  Testa & Smith, supra note 336, at 152.
343. SUBSTANCE-EXPOSED INFANTS, supra note 336, at 15.
344. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(vii)-(ix) (2013).
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out such symptoms.345  Neither the per se approach nor the with-
drawal symptom approach focuses on the core issue of the quality of
the environment in which parents raise children.
Although federal law now requires hospital staff to report drug-
exposed newborns to CPS authorities,346 this CPS-focused approach
has failed to identify the full-range of children and families affected.
The federal government estimates that hundreds of thousands of wo-
men expose developing fetuses to illegal drugs and significant quanti-
ties of alcohol in every trimester of pregnancy347 and that about
400,000 infants are born having been exposed to alcohol or illegal
drugs in utero348—compared to a rough estimate of 20,000 CPS calls
regarding in utero drug exposure.349  Not only has the CPS-focused
approach failed to identify the majority of affected children, this ap-
proach may not even direct women with the most severe substance-
abuse problems to CPS’s attention.  A study of mothers in substance
abuse treatment in California found that those with child protection
system involvement had less severe addiction problems than women
not involved with CPS.350  Rather than addiction severity, the likeli-
hood of CPS involvement increased with economic stress, having more
children (which could exacerbate economic stress), and criminal jus-
tice system involvement.351  The process of identifying which mothers
and substance-exposed children hospital staff report to CPS relates
significantly to “race and class bias in hospital policy and practice re-
garding tests for infant substance exposure.”352  Once CPS learns of
substance-exposed infants and their mothers, CPS has not proven par-
345. N.J. Dep’t of Children & Families, Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.L., 59
A.3d 576, 588 (N.J. 2013).
346. More precisely, federal law requires states to require hospital staff to do so as a
condition of states receiving federal funds.  42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2010).
347. The government estimates that 286,510 fetuses are exposed to an illegal drug in
the first trimester of pregnancy, 130,976 in the second, and 94,139 in the third;
306,975 fetuses are exposed to “binge alcohol” in the first trimester, 106,418 in
the second, and 65,488 in the third.  Nonbinge alcohol exposure is even wider—
843,158 fetuses in the first semester, 417,486 in the second, and 274,231 in the
third. SUBSTANCE-EXPOSED INFANTS, supra note 336, at 10.
348. Id. at 13.
349. SUBSTANCE-EXPOSED INFANTS, supra note 336.  A similar point can be made about
children raised by substance-abusing parents. Prevalence data estimates that
there are six to nine million children with a caregiver who abuses a substance—
compared with three million CPS allegations and only 900,000 substantiated al-
legations, including many that have nothing to do with substance abuse.  Testa &
Smith, supra note 336, at 150.  The American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists suggested that screening for substance abuse is significantly lower
among women who are not pregnant—including many of these parents.  ACOG
OPINION 422, supra note 197, at 5.
350. Grella et al., supra note 342, at 62.
351. Id. at 66–67.
352. Brenda D. Smith & Mark F. Testa, The Risk of Subsequent Maltreatment Allega-
tions in Families with Substance-Exposed Infants, 26 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
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ticularly effective at helping substance-abusing mothers obtain
treatment.353
The solution is not for hospitals to report substance-exposed in-
fants and their mothers to CPS more universally.  Voluntary reporting
of the most high-risk cases should occur.  As argued above, mandatory
reporting laws, like the ineffectual federal law requiring hospitals to
report, should be reformed.354  The goal, instead, should be to lead
drug-abusing pregnant women and mothers355 to obtain the most ef-
fective treatment possible, as soon as possible.  The threat of
mandatory reporting and loss of custody—hallmarks of the present
system—operate contrary to that goal.
A public health approach would adopt several other features.
First, the medical profession would universally screen pregnant and
postpartum women for substance-abuse problems using evidence-
based screening tools.  One study found that treatment during preg-
nancy can reduce infant mortality significantly, by 80% in one study,
and can reduce preterm and low-birth-weight deliveries by a similar
amount.356  Universal screening of pregnant and postpartum wo-
men—at least through questionnaires or interviews shown to be effec-
tive screening tools357—could go a long way toward filling that gap.  It
could also reduce the racial and class inequalities that result from the
status quo of hospitals and doctors subjectively choosing which women
to test for drug and alcohol use.358  Screening for alcoholism among
pregnant women is already near-universal, but use of standardized,
evidence-based protocols occurs too rarely—the American Congress of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) estimates they are only used
by 25% of doctors.359  Screening for illegal drug use is lower: more
97, 99 (2002). See Testa & Smith, supra note 336, at 159; ACOG OPINION 422,
supra note 197, at 6–7.
353. Testa & Smith, supra note 336, at 154 (“When substance abuse is indicated, evi-
dence also casts doubt that CPS is effective in linking parents to substance abuse
services and treatment.”).
354. Supra, section II.A and II.C.
355. This Article uses the gendered term “mothers” because of the biological reality
that only women’s drug use leads to prenatal drug exposure in infants.  Fathers’
drug abuse can lead to harmful neglect just as mothers’ can.  But in terms of
shaping a public health approach to prenatal drug exposure by hospitals, the bio-
logical realities direct a focus on mothers who abuse drugs.
356. Clark, supra note 333, at 186–87.
357. SUBSTANCE-EXPOSED INFANTS, supra note 336, at 26. See also ACOG OPINION
422, supra note 197, at 1 (“As a result of intensive research in addiction over the
past decade, evidence-based recommendations have been consolidated into a pro-
tocol for universal screening questions, brief intervention, and referral to
treatment.”).
358. Barth, supra note 114, at 281.
359. ACOG OPINION 422, supra note 197, at 6.
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than 10% of pregnant women are not screened.360  ACOG has even
described expanding such screening as an ethical imperative.361
A condition of such wider screening is that the law would need to
shield such information from being shared with CPS or law enforce-
ment without the consent of the women tested or a court warrant de-
manding the results.  Broader sharing of such information would
likely inhibit disclosure by patients and even screening tests by doc-
tors.362  Such nonconsensual information sharing with entities em-
powered to impose severe punitive consequences—not the screening
itself—has been the crux of Fourth Amendment challenges.363  Simi-
larly, the law should not define intrauterine substance exposure as a
per se form of child abuse or neglect, as several states do.364  There is
an insufficient causal link between such exposure and harm,365 and
such a definition leads to overly invasive interventions.
Second, doctors and hospitals need to better link pregnant women
with treatment services; even when a problem is identified, there is
too often a gap between the identification and provision of treatment
services.366  State legislators and regulators can assist by more widely
imposing treatment standards—such as rules establishing priority for
pregnant women who need treatment or requiring interim services if
admission to inpatient treatment is not available; such standards ex-
ist in twenty-one states and should be more uniform.367  Postpartum
women should have the opportunity to seek substance-abuse treat-
ment in facilities in which they can take their newborn children; hos-
pitals should release women and babies directly from the maternity
ward to such programs.  Such services may be expensive, but their
greater effectiveness could save money in the long run.368  Hospitals
should employ substance-abuse specialists who can arrange interven-
tions and other tactics designed to induce mothers to enter treatment.
At the very least, hospitals can refer families to substance-abuse pro-
fessionals who can meet the family in the hospital and, if discharged,
at home.  Such professionals would be in a better position to gauge the
severity of risk to an infant at home—whether a mother complies with
treatment, whether other adults can adequately take care of the child,
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 5–6; Dwyer, supra note 198, at 445.
363. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001). See also Gupta-Ka-
gan, supra note 82, at 409 (discussing Ferguson).
364. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(viii) (2013).
365. Testa & Smith, supra note 336, at 161.
366. SUBSTANCE-EXPOSED INFANTS, supra note 336, at 27.
367. Id. at 29.
368. Every dollar spent on treatment can, according to some studies, save up to $7 in
costs associated with ongoing addiction.  ACOG OPINION 422, supra note 197, at
2.
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and whether a parent’s drug use is a debilitating addiction or less un-
healthy recreation.  Such professionals could call CPS when the child
appears at risk.
Third, after children are born exposed to substances, the law needs
to develop more effective ways to link substance-exposed children to
developmental services.  The law currently requires child welfare
agencies to refer young children for early childhood interventions only
if the child is the subject of a substantiated case of child abuse or neg-
lect.369  There is no good reason to condition service referrals on CPS
involvement and substantiation.370  Rather than require such refer-
rals of CPS agencies in limited circumstances, the law should require
doctors and hospital staff to make early childhood developmental and
education referrals directly without using CPS as a middleman.371
None of these ideas suggest that CPS has no role—only that its
role should be focused on cases presenting some risk of harm beyond
substance abuse itself or on cases for which less coercive treatment
options have failed. Similarly, when doctors and hospital staff en-
counter pregnant and postpartum women with substance-abuse
problems, their first call should be to help such women enter treat-
ment, not to CPS.  A call to CPS may come—and, for a large number of
children, will and should come—but it should not be the first call.
These proposals will surely be controversial, as many may be sus-
picious of an approach built around voluntary treatment efforts.
Others have argued forcefully for more aggressive and coercive action
by CPS to protect children of substance-abusing parents.372  The pro-
posals discussed in this Article, however, would not exclude CPS ac-
tions.  They would build a stronger infrastructure of voluntary
services, including a set of individuals who can effectively identify
those children most at risk of abuse or neglect.373  Such steps would
ensure CPS authorities become aware of more of those children than
under the present system.  For these children, the failure of prior ef-
forts would surely be, and should be, relevant to CPS’s decision-mak-
ing.  Accordingly, the proposals outlined in this section could increase
both the number of families who receive voluntary treatment for sub-
stance abuse without separating the family, as well as the number of
infants of substance-abusing parents who are brought to CPS’s atten-
tion for coercive government action.
369. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xxi) (2010).
370. Supra Part V.
371. This requirement could be met by a call to a substance-abuse disorder hotline,
which could then make various referrals.
372. E.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER
DRIVE, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 207–32 (1999); Dwyer, supra note 198, at
449–51.
373. For one possible example of such a case, see supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Virtually everyone familiar with the child welfare system agrees
that it needs significant improvement.  A public health model would
enable society to respond to the millions of children facing mild harms
more effectively and would enable child protection authorities to re-
spond to the more serious cases more effectively.  This Article identi-
fies the legal reforms necessary to create a public health model.
Policymakers should reform elements of the current system that im-
pede a public health approach and build new laws to catalyze develop-
ment of such an approach.
A public health approach is desirable for multiple reasons.  It
would offer a range of interventions that match the range of conditions
that families face, rather than impose a coercive approach on an
overly wide range of families.  These reforms would also expand more
voluntary means of providing secondary and tertiary prevention ser-
vices to families—both by narrowing the scope of coercive interven-
tions and building a legal structure for more voluntary interventions
to troubled families.  Thus, it better respects the constitutional values
of family integrity by avoiding coercive approaches when voluntary
approaches may work.  These reforms would simultaneously focus
such coercive interventions on the most severe cases, thus helping
agencies more effectively protect children from the most severe forms
of abuse.  A public health approach would create clearer and more con-
sistent standards for intervention and thus foster a baseline for the
development of crucial tools for more statistically grounded decisions.
This Article identifies essential elements of such reforms.  It is a
beginning step toward a comprehensive legal infrastructure.  The
value of a public health approach should spark further efforts to iden-
tify necessary reforms and, more broadly, the social science work nec-
essary to develop widely available and high-quality services that can
rest on that infrastructure.
